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THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
Donald P. Kommers*
The quest for political equality has been a major theme of American history.
Indeed, since 1789, the American political system has undergone steady progress
toward increasing democratization.' Slavery was abolished in 1865. The right
to vote is no longer limited by restrictions based on property, race, color, or sex.
Since 1913 United States senators have been elected by the people. Political
equality is afforded to the citizens of each state through the equal protection
and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. And the operation of
the electoral college, originally intended to house a political elite, has been so
modified by the American party system as to render the presidency the most
democratic political institution in the land. Indeed, presidential politics has
brought us as close to majority rule as we can ever expect to get in an imperfect
political world.
All this is the progeny of the philosophy of the Declaration of Independence,
for the idea of equality is implicit in the American political consensus. Yet, as
far as this nation has progressed in building an equalitarian society and approxi-
mating majority rile, the idea has not been fully translated into reality. For
today thousands of American Negroes are being deprived of the right to vote
with the result that they are cut off from any meaningful participation in the
life of our society. The moral and social costs that this nation has paid as a
result of the Negro's disfranchisement are inestimable. As the Civil Rights Com-
mission noted: "There exists here a striking gap between our principles and our
everyday practices. This is a moral gap.- It spills over into and vitiates other
* Assistant Professor of Government, Department of Government and International
Studies, University of Notre Dame. M.A., University of Wisconsin, 1957; Ph.D., University of
Wisconsin, 1962.
1 See generally PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1918);
GOSNELL, DEmOcRACY: THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM (1948); McGOVNEY, THE AMERICAN
SUFFRAGE MEDLEY (1949); WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DE-
MOCRACY 1760-1860 (1960). See also the bibliography in Note, 1 EMERSON AND HABER,
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 141 (1958).
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areas of our society. It runs counter to our traditional concepts of fair play. It is
a partial repudiation of our faith in the democratic system. It undermines the
moral suasion of our national stand in international affairs. It reduces the pro-
ductivity of our Nation."2
The right to vote in a democracy is important because so many other mat-
ters depend upon its exercise. Mr. Justice Black put the point cogently in Wes-
berry v. Sanders:' "No right," he said, "is more precious in a free country than
that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which,
as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory
if the right to vote is undermined." Democracy is meaningless unless each man
is afforded access to social, cultural, intellectual, and economic opportunity. Such
opportunities, as Justice Black intimates, often depend upon one's integration
into the political community. In the case of the American Negro, denial of his
right to vote has, more often than not, deprived him of his manhood, his integ-
rity, and his sense of decency.
A society which is truly free and truly open admits all of its citizens into its
arena of decision-making. Within that framework public policy is determined
by a majority of those who decide to participate in the deliberative process, which
includes the election of public officials. In politics, as in everything else, some
people lose while others win and few are ever completely satisfied with the results
of political contests. But Americans are conditioned to accept these results be-
cause they are arrived at democratically, just as they are conditioned to expect
the peaceful, if not graceful, transfer of power from one party to another in the
aftermath of an election - a clear sign always of a politically mature people
and a stable polity. Democracy, therefore, is a way of making decisions. We
believe in it because it is the best way that wretched and fallible creatures like
ourselves can get along without oppressing one another. According to our theory
of democracy, every qualified citizen is entitled to vote for those who represent
him in the policy-making process. As long as the decision-making machinery is
not tampered with so as to prevent the losers from opposing the policy-makers
in subsequent elections, or to bar them from employing legitimate means of
political influence, or to deprive them of the capacity to reassemble their political
forces in the hope of later attaining victory, the institutional integrity of the
democratic system is preserved.
We are suggesting that actual participation, or at least the right to partici-
pate, in a system of democratic decision-making is of paramount importance,
because a group's non-participation in the political process, particularly when
enforced, may lead to its estrangement or alienation from the body politic. The
danger is that such groups, isolated from the variety, heterogeneity, and dynamic
fluctuations of the total society, are notably susceptible to extremist appeals and
other forms of demagogy.4 Indeed, if citizens are not allowed to participate in
electoral processes or are made to feel that they do not belong, they cannot be
2 1959 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES CoM-1u1ISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 135. [Hereinafter
cited as 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT.]
3 84 Sup. Ct. 526, 535 (1964).
4 For a general discussion of this phenomenon see LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SocIAL
BASES OF POLITICS 77-96 (1960).
THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
expected to develop any genuine loyalty to the political system under which they
live and, after a time, may even begin to question the legitimacy of the system
itself. It seems that the Negro's alienation has already found expression in the
Black Muslim movement, which differs from the protest movements of the past
in that the Muslims have lost their faith in the ability of American democracy
to achieve justice for all. It is this revolutionary potential among disaffected and
disfranchised Negroes that makes it particularly urgent now to redress the griev-
ances which have relegated the Negro to second-class citizenship. The cleavage
between Negroes and white Americans will intensify if qualified Negro citizens
continue to be denied the opportunity to vote. By extending the franchise to all
citizens without regard to race or color all groups will eventually be absorbed
into the American consensus, for we would agree with sociologist Seymour Lipset
that "voting is the key mechanism of consensus in democratic society."5
This article will review past and present efforts of the federal government
to implement the right to vote in the United States and will place particular
emphasis upon the recent work of the Civil Rights Commission and the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department to secure voting rights for the Negro.
Also treated at some length are the political and constitutional problems involved
in implementing the right to vote. Our analysis will take us through the voting
provisions of the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, pending before Congress as this is
written.
I. H-ISTORIcAL BACKGROUND
No less than eight federal constitutional provisions deal with elections and
voting rights. Article I, section 2 provides that electors of the most popular
branch of state legislatures shall be entitled to elect United States representatives.
The seventeenth amendment, providing for the popular election of United States
senators, also makes voter eligibility depend upon qualifications the state pre-
scribes for electors of its most numerous legislative branch while article II, sec-
tion 1 similarly leaves to the states responsibility for determining the manner in
which presidential electors are to be designated. Congressional power over
national elections derives mainly from article I, section 4, which gives Congress
the power to alter state regulations pertaining to the times, places, and manner
of holding elections for senators and congressmen.6
The four remaining provisions limit the states' power over the elective fran-
chise. Though the first section of the fourteenth amendment makes no specific
reference to elections, it obviously means that state election laws governing both
state and national elections must be fairly and equally administered.' The
fifteenth amendment prohibits racial discrimination in the exercise of the fran-
chise by declaring, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
5 Id. at 30.
6 Article I, Section 5 also gives to each house of the national legislature the right to judge
the election of its members. Thus, either house has jurisdiction to inquire into the legality of
such an election and to settle contested elections. Under Article II Congress also determines the
time of choosing presidential electors.
7 Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides for the reduction of a state's Con-
gressional representation proportionate to the number of citizens denied the right to vote, but
Congress has not yet invoked the provision.
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be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." The nineteenth amendment extended
freedom of the suffrage to women, barring any abridgement of the right to vote
on account of sex. Finally, the twenty-fourth amendment, ratified January 23,
1964, forbids the imposition of a poll tax as a condition for voting in national
elections.9
Congressional debate over civil rights bills often centers on whether Congress
has the power to control voter qualifications under section 4 of article I. The
provision is susceptible to varying interpretation. It might be construed to sanc-
tion congressional legislation only if a state in the first instance fails to regulate
the times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representa-
tives."0 On the other hand, the term "manner" might be broadly construed to
permit federal surveillance over any aspect of congressional elections, including
voter qualifications, regardless of whether a state has enacted prior regulations,
for the Constitution states that Congress may at any time'alter such regulations.
Section 4 of article I, however, must be considered together with section 2
of article I and the seventeenth amendment, both of which seem to give the
states power to define the qualifications of electors where federal elections are
concerned. The Convention's decision to leave this power to the states reflected
not essentially the framers' conviction that the matter ought to be a reserved
right of the states, but simply a pragmatic adjustment to a difficult situation
deriving from the great variation in voter qualification laws among the original
thirteen states and the consequent inability of the Convention to agree on any
uniform standard of voter eligibility."
The federal system further complicates the matter of congressional power
over elections in view of the fact that we possess dual citizenship, for the privileges
and immunities of the United States are not coextensive with those of the states.' 2
Though the right to vote for senators and representatives is secured by the fed-
eral constitution," freedom of suffrage is not a privilege of United States citizen-
ship. 4 That privilege depends upon state voter qualifications;" once these have
been determined the federal constitutional right to vote automatically follows,
and Congress may then employ the means at its disposal to guarantee the un-
8 N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1964, p. 1, col. 6.
9 The most recent amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares that "The right of citizens
of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice-President, for
electors for President or Vice-President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax
or other tax." U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
10 This was the point of view urged by several legislators when the proposal to elect Sen-
ators on a popular basis was being argued. See 47 CONG. REc. 1925 (1911) and 48 CONG.
REc. 6367 (1912).
11 ELLIOT, 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 385-386 (1863).
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (Hamilton or Madison).
12 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
13 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Swaf-
ford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
14 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214 (1875); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621
(1904). In Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1937), the court of appeals held
that the right to vote for presidential electors depended "exclusively upon state legislation."
15 The Supreme Court has ruled that the right to vote is not even inherent in state citizen-
ship. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
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impeded and unadulterated exercise of that right. 6 But under section 4 of
article I, congressional power over the electoral process seems to stop where the
election of federal officals ends. Accordingly, in United States v. Reese,' the
Supreme Court held invalid provisions of an 1870 statute which were applied to
enforce the right of a Negro citizen to vote in a'state election. There the Court
indicated that while the fifteenth amendment conferred a constitutional right to
be exempt "from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," it did not confer any
right of suffrage itself.'
The Enforcement Act of 1870, enacted during Reconstruction, was the
first major piece of federal legislation providing machinery for supervising
elections in the states. According to its provisions, any violation of state laws
governing the election of national officers, or any interference, private or official,
with a citizen's right to vote, or any fraudulent act or conduct in registering
eligible voters, in counting ballots, or in assessing the results of an election, was
made a federal crime."9 Though the constitutionality of the 1870 act was upheld
by the Supreme Court as applied to federal elections,"° Congress repealed in
1894 most of the provisions dealing with the direct federal supervision -of elections
in the states,2' reflecting, it would appear, a congressional preference for placing
the conduct of elections back into the exclusive hands of state authorities. Left
standing, however, were two general civil rights provisions providing criminal
sanctions against, conspiracies to deprive any citizen of any right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States,22 and against the deprivation of
constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities under color of state law. 2 A
16 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385
(1944); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915). In the Yarbrough case the Court said:
The States in prescribing the qualifications of voters for the most numer-
ous branch of their own legislatures, do not do this with reference to the
election of members of Congress. Nor can they prescribe the qualification
for voters for those eo nomine. They define who are to vote for the popular
branch of their own legislature, and the Constitution of the United States
says the same persons shall vote for members of Congress in that State. It
adopts the qualifications thus furnished as the qualification of its own electors
for members of Congress.
It is not true, therefore, that electors for members of Congress owe
their right to vote to the State law in any sense which makes the exercise of
the right to depend exclusively on the Law of the .State. Ex parte Yar-
brough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1884).
17 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
18 Id., at 218.
19 16 Stat. 140 (1870). See also 16 Stat. 254 (1870) and 17 Stat. 347-49 (1872).
20 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); United
States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65 (1883); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888).
21 28 Stat. 36 (1894).
22 The provision now reads:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimi-
date any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because
of his having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises
of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege so secured -
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both. 62 Stat. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958).
23 This provision now reads:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District
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third provision which survived the 1894 repealer was the simple guarantee that
all citizens of the United States qualified to vote by law shall be entitled to do so
without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude.2 4 Simply declara-
tory of the constitutional right based upon the fifteenth amendment, this section
imposes no punishment for its violation;25 it is usually invoked along with some
other relevant federal law which does afford a remedy. It is also possible for a
private citizen to invoke an old 1871 statute26 for civil damages in the event
that persons acting under state law or custom deprive him of rights secured by
federal laws or the Constitution. 7
As noted, all three of these general civil rights statutes insure rights secured
by the Constitution and federal laws. But their implementation has caused some
difficulty. Again we would note that the right to vote generally depends upon
state law, for federal control over national elections obtains only after a state
has declared, by its voter eligibility laws, who is entitled to vote. But suppose
the federal government has not chosen specifically to regulate the conduct of
elections for federal officers, as Congress has not done except for a brief period
of twenty-four years When the Enforcement Act was on the books. May state
abridgment of the right to vote in that circumstance be redressed under the
criminal sanctions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42? This was the issue presented in
United States v. Mosley." There the Court extended the coverage of the con-
spiracy statute to protection of the right to vote for members of Congress. But
in United States v. Bathgate9 the Court held that a conspiracy to bribe voters
in federal elections was not covered by the statute in view of "the policy of Con-
gress not to interfere with elections within a State except by clear and specific
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro-
tected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an
alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punish-
ment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both. 62 Stat. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958).
24 It states:
All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to
vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county,
city, parish, township, school district, municipality or other territorial sub-
division, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without
distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution,
law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under
its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding. 16 Stat. 140 (1870), 42
U.S.C. § 1971(a) (1958). The Constitutionality of this provision was up-
held in two early lower court decisions. In re Engel, 8 Fed. Cas. 716 (No.
4, 488) (C.C.D. Md. 1877); Kellogg v. Warmouth, 14 Fed. Gas. 257 (No.
7,667) (C.C.D. La. 1872). See also Karem v. United States, 121 F. 250
(6th Cir. 1903), and Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946).
25 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 216 (1875).
26 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
27 It states that "every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 17
Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
28 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
29 246 U.S. 220, 226 (1918) (emphasis added). The Court seemed on sounder ground when
it refused to apply the conspiracy statute to primary elections which Congress up to this time
had never sought to control. See United States v. O'Toole, 243 U.S. 476, 486-89 (1917). But
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provisions!" Failing to read such a clear and indisputable intent into legislative
history the Supreme Court, without overruling Bathgate, returned to the spirit
of United States v. Mosley when it held, Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, that a
conspiracy by election officials to stuff a ballot box in an election for a United
States senator was an offense punishable by 18 U.S.C. § 241, which includes
both the right to cast a ballot and to have it counted." Since United States v:
Saylor, section 241 has been invoked frequently to punish federal election
frauds.3 ' It has been used less often to prosecute interferences with the right to
vote growing out of intimidation or violence.
Another problem arises from the fact that under the fifteenth amendment,
the right to vote is protected against governmental, not private discriminatory
action, and then only action which is discriminatory on account of race or color.3 2
This has raised the question whether 18 U.S.C. § 241, since directed against
conspiracies by "two or more persons," is appropriate legislation under the
amendment. That discriminatory state action was not alleged in a conspiracy
of private persons to deprive certain Negroes of various civil rights constituted
one reason the Supreme Court found the federal government's charges defective
in United States v. Cruikshank.3 In United States v. Harris,34 the Court actually
struck down a similarly worded conspiracy statute on the ground that the four-
teenth amendment does not forbid private conspiracies to deprive persons of the
equal protection of the laws. On the other hand, 18 U.S.C. § 242, enacted to
implement both fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, specifically prohibits
deprivations of constitutional rights under color of state law; but it is broader
than 18 U.S.C. § 241 since it affects any person, not only conspiracies, which
must involve two or more persons, acting under law. And since the fourteenth
amendment is involved, it is not confined to discrimination based on race or color.
However, the provision has seldom been used to protect the right to vote. 5 The
any lingering hope that Congress might be able to regulate primary elections to select candi-
dates for federal office was dashed in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921) where
the Court held that primaries were not elections within the meaning of Article I, Section 4;
thus, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was unconstitutional as applied to a candidate for the
United States Senate running in a primary election. But see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941).
30 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
31 See, e.g., Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
644 (1938); Ledford v. United States, 155 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
733 (1946); Klein v. United States, 176 F.2d 184 (8th Gir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870(1949); Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 339 U.S. 974 (1950);
Crolich v. United States, 196 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 830 (1952);
Fields v. United States, 228 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 982 (1956);
United States v. Nathan, 238 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
32 James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903). There the Supreme Court struck down a pro-
vision of the Enforcement Act of 1870 since it was intended to prevent private parties as well
as state officials from interfering with the right of suffrage. Not only did the indictment fail to
allege that Negro voters were bribed by state officials, but also failed to allege that the Negroes
in question were bribed because of their race.
33 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875).
34 106 U.S. 629 (188.2).
35 Prior to United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), this provision was used only
once with respect to elections. In United States v. Stone, 188 Fed. 836 (D. Md. 1911), Mary-
land election officials were convicted for conspiring to deny Negroes the right to vote at a con-
gressional election. The Classic case pointed out that two offences are actually created by the
provision. The first is willfully subjecting any person to the deprivation of rights secured by the
Constitution; the second is willfully subjecting any person to different punishments on account
of his alienage, color or race, than prescribed for the punishment of other citizens. United
States v. Classic, supra, at 327.
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lack of any machinery in the Justice Department prior to 1939 to enforce the
right to vote may be one reason why these criminal sanctions have not often
been invoked or effectively applied in the voting field.
Nor has the civil damage suit or the equitable proceeding, allowed under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, been an effective legal sanction for implementing the right
to vote. A civil damage suit is an unrealistic remedy as seems evidenced from
the paucity of such cases against the backdrop of widespread discrimination.
The same is true of equitable relief. In both instances the initiative must come
from the aggrieved citizen who, for various reasons, may be reluctant to get
himself involved in the web of litigation, if indeed he is even aware of his rights
under law. Justice Holmes once pointed out the utter futility of disposing of
such controversies in the judicial forum. He said:
Unless we are prepared to supervise . . . voting in [the state] by
officers of the court, it seems to us that all the plaintiff could get
from equity would be an empty form. Apart from damages to the
individual, relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged,
by the people of a State and the State itself, must be given by them
or by the legislative and political department of the government
of the United States."
Moreover, the Supreme Court has applied these broad civil rights provisions
with considerable restraint. The traditional conservative approach to the Court's
construction of these provisions was indicated by the remark of Mr. Justice
Jackson in Collins v. Hardyman7 where he said they were "not to be used to
centralize power so as to upset the federal system."
A good deal of tension obviously exists between the right of a state to control
elections and the right of the citizen to cast a ballot. But the extent of state
power over elections has been more sharply defined than Justice Jackson's com-
ment might lead us to believe. Let us briefly review the landmark decisions of
the Supreme Court which appear to set forth the boundaries of state power in this
sensitive area of federal-state relations.
It should be recalled at the outset that though the right to vote in federal
elections, at least, is secured by the Constitution," the Court has upheld reason-
able state regulations over the exercise of that right. Thus it is permissible for
a state to write voter qualification laws which will insure the integrity and
elevate the quality of popular participation in the electoral process. But such
laws must apply equally to all citizens. Our theory of government may not imply
universal suffrage in the absolute sense, but it does imply absolute equality in
the exercise of the franchise, once granted. It bars, for example, unreasonable
classifications like those which were at issue in Guinn v. United States.9 There
the famous "grandfather clause" of the Oklahoma Constitution was struck down
since it provided that no person could be registered unless able to read and write
any section of the state constitution, except that those whose ancestors were
eligible to vote prior to January 1, 1866, were exempted from the literacy re-
quirement, an obvious subterfuge to disfranchise the Negro. Somewhat more
36 Giles v. Frarris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903).
37 341 U.S. 651, 658 (1951).
38 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). See supra note 13.
39 238 U.S. 347 (1915). See also Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
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subtle but no less invidious was a subsequent Oklahoma registration law which
made eligible voters out of all Oklahomans who had voted in the 1914 election
-which, incidentally, was conducted in accordance with the old "grandfather
clause"- but those persons who did not vote at that time were required to
register to vote, if qualified, between April 30, 1916, and May 11, 1916.40 A
Negro, though qualified to register and vote in 1916, failed to do so. Many
years later, in 1934, when he finally decided to register, he was denied a regis-
tration certificate for his failure to register within the time specified eighteen
years earlier. The statute worked to disfranchise him permanently. Recognizing
the Oklahoma statute for what it was the Supreme Court declared:
[Tihe reach of the Fifteenth Amendment against contrivances by a
state to thwart equality in the enjoyment of the right to vote by
citizens of the United States regardless of race or color, has been
amply expounded.... The Amendment nullifies sophisticated as
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous
procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the
franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may
remain unrestricted as to race.41
For a long time the white primary, as it developed in the South, was a
favorite device for disfranchising the Negro. The significance of the primary
election as it relates to non-voting among southern Negroes will be discussed
below. But for the moment suffice it to say that the white primary insured the
hegemony of the Democratic Party in the South and with that the political
impotence of the Negro. The constitutional theory which appeared to have
legitimized the southern practice of excluding Negroes from participation in
Democratic Party primaries was that a political party, being a private association,
could escape the proscriptions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments which
barred only state discriminatory action. Thus a political party, acting inde-
pendently of the state, .might pass resolutions forbidding Negroes from taking
part in any intra-party deliberations or contests with constitutional impunity.
The Supreme Court breathed life into this theory in Grovey v. Townsend'2 where
the Court declined to identify the state with the discriminatory practices of the
Texas Democratic Party, even though state law governed many aspects of primary
elections. In an incredibly myopic view of the situation the Court simply failed
to appreciate the intrinsic relationship between the privilege of party member-
ship, upon which participation in the primary election depended, and the right
to vote in the general election. 4' But Grovey has to be considered along with
40 Okla. Laws 1916, ch. 24, § 4, at 34.
41 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
42 295 U.S. 45 (1935).43 Id. at 55. Prior to Grovey the Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute which ex-
pressly barred Negroes from participating in a democratic party primary election as a "direct
and obvious infringement" of the fourteenth amendment. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541
(1927). Five years later in an opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo, the Court also struck down a
Texas law which delegated to the State Executive Committee of the Texas Democratic Party
the power to prescribe the requisites of party membership, pursuant to which the Committee
promulgated a rule excluding Negroes from party membership and a fortiori, from participation
in primary elections. Since the power to establish the policy of Negro exclusion was derived
from state law the Court regarded it as state action in contravention of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). The question whether a political party has
unrestrained power to define its membership in the absence of any state law governing its
organizatioi and conduct was reserved for Grovey v. Townsend, supra note 42.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Newberry v. United States44 which held that congressional power over elections
does not extend to primaries since the primary is not an election within the
meaning of the Constitution, but simply a device, like the party caucus or con-
vention, for selecting nominees to run in the general election.
The tide began to turn in 1941 with United States v. Classic.'s Though
not involving any question of racial discrimination, that case had to do with a
prosecution under sections 19 and 20 of the Criminal Code (now 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242) against persons accused of willfully altering and falsifying
ballots cast by voters in a Louisiana primary election. The question as to
whether the constitutional right to vote for members of Congress had been
infringed in violation of the Criminal Code depended again on whether a
primary election was in fact an election within the meaning of article 1, sec-
tion 4. In refusing to read the term "election" with "stultifying narrowness,""
the Court held that primaries do constitute elections in which citizens have
the right to participate for the purpose of choosing their representatives in Con-
gress, provided that "the primary is by [state] law made an integral part of
the election machinery" or "where in fact the primary effectively controls the
choice" of candidates. 7
Here the Court set down two tests for determining whether primaries
are elections within the meaning of the Constitution. The first depends on
whether the primary is integral to the election as a matter of state law; the
second, on whether the primary in fact governs the election outcome. Both tests
were eventually applied to bar political parties from discriminating in primaries
on account of race. After Nixon v. Condon4" a state convention of the Texas
Democratic Party passed a resolution excluding Negroes from its primaries.
The exclusion was presumably based on an action of a voluntary association
and hence outside constitutional proscriptions.49 But in Smith v. Allwright50
the Court observed that the primary election, though run by party officials,
was conducted under state law and, therefore, constituted an integral part of
the election process. The exclusion policy of the Texas Democratic Party was
accordingly held to violate the fifteenth amendment. "[W]hen, as here," said the
Court, "that privilege [party membership] is also the essential qualification for
44 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
45 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
46 Id. at 320.
47 Id. at 318. Said Mr. Justice Stone: "Unless the constitutional protection of the integri-
ty of 'elections' extends to primary elections, Congress is left powerless to effect the constitu-
tional purpose, and the popular choice of representatives is stripped of its constitutional pro-
tection save only as Congress, by taking over the control of state elections, may exclude from
them the influence of the state primaries." Id. at 319.
48 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
49 In Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 74 S.W.2d 113 (1934), the Supreme Court of Texas
ruled that the Texas Democratic Party was a "voluntary association." The Court stated that
"since the right to organize and maintain a political party is one guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights of this state, it necessarily follows that every privilege essential or reasonably appropri-
ate to the exercise of that right is likewise guaranteed, including, of course, the privilege of
determining the policies of the party and its membership. Without the privilege of determining
the power of a political association and its membership, the right to organize such an associa-
tion would be a mere mockery." Id. at 120.
50 321 U.S. 649 (1944). See also Perry v. Cyphers, 186 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1951).
THE RIGHT TO VOTE -AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the State makes the
action of the party the action of the State."'"
The second test was applied in Terry v. Adams. 2 The Democratic Party
had established private, clubs - known as Jaybird Associations - in several
Texas counties to hold pre-primary elections. Composed of all eligible white
voters in the county and wholly unregulated by law, these associations
would proceed to select candidates to run in the primary and in this way con-
trol the final outcome of the general election. In rejecting the contention that
these associations were exclusively private clubs the Supreme Court, in follow-
ing two lower federal court decisions,53 held that the state had in effect ab-
dicated its rightful authority over the electoral process to these local associations.
Since the elections conducted by these associations ultimately determined who
shall govern, Negroes lost "every vestige of influence in selecting the officials
who control the local county matters that intimately touch the daily lives of
citizens."'  The Court was emphatic in its rejection of the pre-primary device:
"For a state to permit such a duplication of its election is to permit a flagrant
abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of the fifteenth amendment."55
It appears that the southern imagination would be hard put to come up with
any other plan that might successfully circumvent these decisions; the white
primary has been relegated to the less illustrious annals of our history.
Although these cases gave us an important body of law on the constitu-
tional right to vote, they did not generate any significant increase in the incidence
of voting among Negroes in the South. Despite the fact that the gap between
our political ideals and the bitter reality of discrimination was wide enough
for all to see, there seemed not much official concern or popular desire to close
the ethical gap in our national life until a century of quasi-oppression exploded
into the great American Negro revolution of the late 1950's that is still with
us today. But even before the emergent political activism of the modem Negro
the groundwork for new federal initiatives in the civil rights field, after decades
of official inertia, was slowly being laid.
In 1939 Attorney General Frank Murphy established a Civil Rights Sec-
51 321 U.S. 649, 664-65 (1944).
52 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
53 Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. S.C. 1947), aff'd 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948). There South Carolina had repealed all its laws pertaining
to primary elections after which the Democratic Party proceeded to hold the primary while
excluding Negroes from voting therein. After the Party was enjoined from continuing its dis-
criminatory exclusion of Negroes the control of primaries was placed in the hands of local clubs
which also excluded Negroes. In holding this scheme unconstitutional the Court of Appeals
stated:
The argument is made that a political party does not exercise state
power but is a mere voluntary organization of citizens to which the constitu-
tional limitations upon the powers of the state have no application. This
may be true of a political party which does not undertake the performance
of state functions, but not of one which is allowed by the state to take over
and operate a vital part of its electoral machinery. When the organization
of the party and the primary which it conducts are so used in connection
with the general election that the latter merely registers and gives effect to
the discrimination which they have sanctioned, such discrimination must be
enjoined to safeguard the election itself from giving effect to that which the
Constitution forbids. Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391, 394 (4th Cir. 1949).
54 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953).
55 Id. at 469.
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tion in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. 6 It appears that
hundreds of complaints involving election irregularities were brought to the
attention of the Civil Rights Section, but most of these were dismissed after
investigation and only a very few cases involved racial discrimination.5" Per-
haps the most important result of the Section's work was the realization that
current civil rights statutes were inadequate to redress many wrongs in the
civil rights field. The government could not bring civil suits and was reluctant
to invoke available criminal sanctions.5 Indeed, very few criminal prosecutions
were brought by the Civil Rights Section. Carr summed the matter up by say-
ing that the Section's activity represented "a commendable program ham-
strung by lack of authority and an inadequate organization."59 It seemed ob-
vious that an effective program of federal protection of civil rights would
have to depend on further congressional legislation.6"
The report of President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights set in mo-
tion a chain of events which culminated, a full decade later, in the first major
civil rights statute since 1875. The Committee reported that "the denial of
the suffrage on account of race is the most serious present interference with
the right to vote."'" Literacy tests, poll taxes, as well as terror and intimidation,
constituted the principal methods of disfranchising Negroes.62 To shore up
the citizen's right to vote, the Committee recommended federal action to
56 1939 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 2. For an excellent study of the work, successes, and frus-
trations of the Civil Rights Section see CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).
57 See, for example, 1955 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 130-32. See also REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To Secure These Rights 120 (1947). [Hereinafter
cited as PRESMENT'S COMMITTEE REP.].
58 In this connection Carr reported:
The number of criminal prosecutions the ORS has been responsible
for, since its creation in 1939, is phenomenally low. This low number is due
to the inadequacy of the national police force whose responsibility it is to
discover civil liberty offenses. It is also due to the deterring knowledge that
it is exceedingly hard to obtain convictions in criminal cases of this type.
Here we have criminal sanctions operating in exactly the way they are in-
tended to operate, i.e., providing a means by which society can be ordered,
and recalcitrant individuals forced into line through warning and negotia-
tion, without the necessity of imposing extreme penalties of law in every
instance. CAR, op. cit., supra note 56, at 198.
And in 1956, the year before the creation of a separate division of civil rights in the Justice
Department the Attorney General reported: "Events may make more urgent the need for
passage of such legislation [the Eisenhower Administration's civil rights bill], but whether the
need increases or decreases, the Department of Justice should have the more flexible civil
powers provided by the Bill and should not be restricted to the use of the cumbersome and
ofter harsh criminal proceedings under the two criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 241 and § 242."
1956 ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 122. See also the evaluation of the Civil Rights Section by
President Truman's special committee on civil rights. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE REP.
59 CARR, op. cit. supra note 56, at 203.
60 Speaking before a Senate Subcommittee looking into proposed civil rights legislation in
1949 Thurgood Marshall, then special counsel for the NAACP, said:
During the period this Division [Civil Rights Section] has been in exist-
ence and especially during the administration of Attorney General Tom
Clark, the main reasons more progress has not been made are (1) the in-
adequacies of the existing civil-rights statutes; (2) the lack of full depart-
mental status under an Assistant Attorney General; (3) lack of a sufficient
number of agents for the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and, finally, the
lack of sufficient funds to operate. Hearings on S. 1725 and S. 1734 Before
a Subcommittee on the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 31 (1949).
61 PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE REP. 35.
62 Id. at 37-40.
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(1) abolish the poll tax in state and federal elections, (2) protect the right of
qualified persons to', participate in federal elections against interference by
public officials and private persons, and (3) insure that state registration and
election laws are administered impartially and without regard to race or color 6 3
To accomplish these objectives and to strengthen the machinery for the pro-
tection of civil rights generally -the Committee also recommended (1) the crea-
tion of a Civil Rights Division within the Justice Department, (2) the estab-
lishment by statute of a permanent Commission on Civil Rights in the Execu-
tive Office of the President, and (3) a Joint Standing Committee on Civil
Rights in Congress.6" These and other civil rights proposals had the support
of both President Truman and President Eisenhower.65 Hearings were held
on several of them,6 , but not until 1957 w~s any civil rights measure able to
survive the opposition of the southern bloc in Congress.
II. THE CrviL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1957 AND 1960
Though falling far short of its objective, the Civil Rights Act of 19576"
was intended to make the fifteenth amendment bar against racial discrimina-
tion in the exercise of the franchise a living reality. In addition to creating a
six member bipartisan: Civil Rights Commission to "investigate allegations...
63 Id. at 160-61.
64 Id. at 151-54. Also recommended were the (1) creation of a civil rights unit within the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, (2) establishment of civil rights enforcement units in state
governments, (3) establishment of permanent state commissions on civil rights, and (4) in-
creased professionalization of state and local police forces.
65 See presidential messages in 94 CONG. REc. 33,928, 9442 (1948); 95 CONG. ERc. 2671
(1949); 96 CONG. REc. 63 (1950); 100 CONG. R e. 82 (1954); 102 CONo. REc. 143 '(1956);
103 CONG. REC. 410 (1957).
66 Hearings on S. 1725 and S. 1734, supra note 60; Hearings on S. 1 and S. 535 Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); Hear-
ings on Miscellaneous Bills Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within the Jurisdiction of
the United States Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the judiciary, 84th
Cong. 1st Sess., ser. 11, pt. 1 (1955); Hearings on Civ'il Rights Before the House Committee
on the judiciary, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., ser. 11, pt. 2 (1956); Hearings on Civil Rights Pro-
posals Before the Senate Committee on the judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); Hearings
on Civil Rights Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee of the judiciary, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1 (1957); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
In 1956 the Justice Department investigated complaints that Negro voters were being
purged in large numbers from voter registration lists in ten Louisiana parishes and found wide-
spread discrimination prevalent in each of these parishes (Bienville, Caldwell, De Soto, Grant,
Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Ouachita, Rapides, and Union). The following excerpts from the
Attorney General's Annual Report are illustrative of the discriminatory practices involved:
In Ouachita Parish, for instance, all of the 2,388 Negro voters iri one
ward, but none of the white voters in that ward, were challenged. The regis-
trar refused to accept affidavits on behalf of the challenged voters from wit-
nesses who were from any precinct other thah that of the challenged voter
or from witnesses who had themselves been challenged. Further, she refused
to permit a registered voter to act as a witness for more than one challenged
voter. The imposition of these requirements, of course, made it practically
impossible for challenged Negro voters to "prove" their right to remain on
the registration rolls.
In Caldwell Parish the registrar even went to the extreme of refusing to
accept registered white voters as witnesses on behalf of challenged Negro
voters, stating as his grounds that the witness must be of the same race as
the voter who had been challenged. In other instances he also required that
the witnesses be accompanied by a law enforcement officer to "identify" them.
1957 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 107-09.
67 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
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that certain citizens of the United States are being deprived of their right
to vote and have that vote counted by reason of their color, race, religion, or
national origin,""8 Congress broadened the coverage of 42 U.S.C. 1971 to
protect voting rights in special, general, and primary elections where federal
officials are being selected, against interferences by private persons as well as
by persons acting under color of law.69 The Attorney General was empowered
to initiate and institute civil actions to protect persons against the deprivations
proscribed by the Act."' Moreover, the federal district courts were granted
jurisdiction over such proceedings regardless of whether the party aggrieved
had failed to exhaust administrative or judicial remedies provided by state
law." Because of congressional fears that impartial southern juries would be
hard to find," Congress provided that in a criminal contempt case arising
under the Act, the district court judge might, in his discretion, try the case
with or without a jury, except that when a person is convicted and fined more
than $300 or is imprisoned for more than 45 days, he may demand a new trial
before a jury."3
This was the law. But law in theory and law in action are two entirely
different matters, as the first comprehensive report of the Civil Rights Com-
mission dramatically illustrated. 4 Two years after the Civil Rights Act had
gone into effect the Justice Department had filed only three suits under the
new statute' despite substantial evidence that discrimination against Negroes
seeking to vote was being widely practiced in numerous counties and parishes
throughout the South.6
68 71 Stat. 635 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975c (1958).
69 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1958).
70 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1958).
71 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1958). With respect to dispensing with the
exhaustion doctrine the House Report which accompanied H.R. 6127 stated as follows:
Insofar as State judicial remedies are concerned, this new proposal is
declaratory of existing law. In Lane v. Wilson (307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939)),
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that there was no require-
ment that a party exhaust State judicial remedies before resorting to a
Federal court for relief pursuant to a Federal civil rights statute. As to the
exhaustion of State administrative remedies, the proposal does change exist-
ing laws to a certain extent. In two cases, Peay v. Cox (190 F.2d 123
(1951)), and Carson v. Warlick (238 F.2d 724 (1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 910 (1957), it was held by the courts that an exhaus-
tion of State administrative remedies was necessary before seeking relief in
the Federal district court. In the first case, the right to vote was involved
and the second case involved school segregation. The Committee on the
Judiciary believes that a waiver of the doctrine of exhaustion of State admin-
istrative remedies is necessary in civil-rights cases, particularly when injunc-
tive relief is sought. . . .This is particularly true with regard to election
matters where the action complained of can result in a deprivation of the
individual's right to vote. H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11
(1957).
72 See 103 CONG. RE .14478 (1957). (Remarks of Senator Fulbright.) It might be noted
that the Justice Department occasionally found difficulty in getting indictments in civil rights
cases under criminal statutes. For instance, a Federal Grand Jury impaneled in Louisiana in
December, 1956 refused to return any indictments in connection with widespread discrimination
against Negroes by voting registrars in several Louisiana parishes. 1957 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP.
109.
73 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (1958).
74 See 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 134-142.
75 1959 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. RP. 180-181.
76 See Voting, Hearings Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Montgom-
ery, Alabama (1958-59). See also 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 55-106.
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This was a bleak beginning for an enterprise which had begun with
cautious optimism. Frustration in the Justice Department ran high in the
few cases that were instituted because of dilatory tactics of southern state
officials,7 many of whom also forbade the Civil Rights Division to inspect local
voting records for evidence of discrimination."8 Following two years of experi-
ence under the 1957 Act, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil
Rights Division was constrained to conclude that "for some time to come, every
action initiated in racial voting and registration cases will be challenged in
every possible way to prevent or delay the implementation of the purpose of
Congress."' Even the Civil Rights Commission, in its purely fact-finding ca-
pacity, was occasionally stymied in its effort to inspect local voter registration
records 0 and, in one instance, was temporarily restrained from holding a
scheduled hearing in Louisiana."'
In the meantime significant litigation was flowing through the federal
courts where the Justice Department was gaining mixed results. When the
Civil Rights Commission began to undertake its investigatory duties, the con-
stitutionality of certain rules of procedure adopted by it was challenged in a
lawsuit brought by certain voting registrars in Louisiana. It appears that the
Commission would not allow witnesses responding to subpoenas and subpoenas
duces tecum to be informed of the complaints against them or to confront their
accusers and cross-examine them. The court below found nothing in the 1957
77 1959 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 181.
78 See testimony of Attorney General William P. Rogers on pending civil rights bills in the
86th Congress, Hearings an Civil Rights Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee
on the judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 5, 211 (1959). In another statement before the Sub-
committee Congressman McCullouch observed:
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 was aimed at protecting the basic right of
all eligible citizens to vote in Federal elections. But the effectiveness of this
legislation has been undermined. State voting records have, in certain
cases, been withheld from Federal authorities investigating alleged franchise
violations. Defeat of these attempts in the courts has triggered resort to
more drastic means of avoidance. Pending or proposed in the legislatures of
several States, I am informed, are bills to authorize the outright destruction
of voting records soon after elections in order to prevent their falling into
the hands of Federal investigators. Such measures bode no good for the
cause of representative government. Id. at 151.
79 1960 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 177. In the previous report the Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Joseph M. F. Ryan, Jr. lamented the fact that "a great deal of time and effort has
been spent in answering attacks made on the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
and it is apparent from the tactics which are being pursued by the defendants that the Divi-
sion will be faced with the same problem in every suit which is filed under the Act. These
efforts to hinder and hamper the discharge of duties imposed under the Act have, of course,
added a substantial burden to the already heavy workload of the Division." 1959 ATT'y GEN.
ANN. REP. 181. On the other hand, Congressman Peter W. Rodino, Chairman of Subcommit-
tee No. 5, appeared dissatisfied with the record of the Civil Rights Division under the 1957
Act in view of former Attorney General Brownell's statement that voting denials were wide-
spread. In answer to a query on this point, Attorney General Rogers pointed out that com-
plaints under the Act were few, evidence was difficult to procure, in addition to which the
Justice Department was exercising great care in selecting for prosecution only those cases which
would give sure support to the Government's position. See Hearings-Before Subcommittee No.
5, supra note 78, at 214-215. The Civil Rights Commission also reported that "its [Civil
Rights Division] legal actions were disappointing in number, nature, and results." 1959 CIVIL
RIGHTS REPORT 132.
80 See 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 70-71. See also testimony of Gordon M. Tiffany, Staff
Director, Commission on Civil Rights, Hearings on Civil Rights Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at
247-255 (1959).
81 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 99-100.
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Act authorizing the Commission to deprive witnesses of these procedural guar-
antees. 2 The Supreme Court, however, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting,
held that since the Commission was not an adjudicatory but rather an inves-
tigatory body, the rules of procedure did not violate the Due Process Clause
of the fifth amendment."
A three-judge federal district court, in United States v. Raines,4 held the
1957 Act unconstitutional since the statute was construed to reach the dis-
criminatory actions of private persons as well as state officials. The Supreme
Court, on appeal, reversed, 5 holding that, since discriminatory state ac-
tion, clearly within the proscription of the fifteenth amendment, was
actually involved, the lower court erred in reaching a constitutional question
it did not have to decide. The same issue was raised in a second case where
the United States brought suit against members of the White Citizens' Council
and the Registrar of Voters in Washington Parish, Louisiana, for conspiring
to purge registration rolls and thus effectively disfranchising 85% of the Negro
voters in that parish."s It was clear to the Court, and admitted by defendants,
that the purge was conducted under color of state law." The court refused
to strike the statute down on the ground that it might be read to cover the
actions of private individuals.8 8 In still another proceeding these challenges
of the registration status of Negroes, though initiated under valid state law,
were nevertheless regarded as "massively discriminatory in purpose and effect,
and as such unconstitutional." 9
The Justice Department suffered a setback, however, in an action against
the State of Alabama, the Board of Registrars of Macon County, Alabama,
and two individual registrars who had resigned after refusing to produce vot-
ing records in their custody on the advice of Alabama's Attorney General.9"
The proceeding was vitiated by the court's holding that (1) the registrars, hav-
ing resigned, were no longer suable in their official capacities, (2) the Board
82 Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1959).
83 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). See the concurring opinion of Justice Frank-
furter at 486-93.
84 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959). This was the first case brought by the Attorney
General under the 1957 Act. It was an action against certain registrars of Terrel County,
Georgia, to prevent them from arbitrarily refusing to allow Negroes to register. The federal
district court rejected the contention that this was not a legitimate exercise of its equitable juris-
diction and further ruled that Congress had the authority under the Constitution to authorize
injunctive relief without regard to other state remedies which might be - and in this case
were - available.
85 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
86 United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La. 1959), aff'd 362 U.S. 58 (1960).
87 Id. at 13. In an earlier opinion denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court
said: "The legislative history of this legislation shows that Congress was aware of the wide-
spread attempt to disenfranchise the Negro, overtly through statutory enactments, and covert-
ly through discriminatory administration of voting laws. Congress was also aware that dis-
enfranchisement can be accomplished only with the cooperation of persons acting under color
of state law since registration rolls are in the custody and under the control of state officers."
United States v. McElveen, 177 F. Supp. 355, 360 (1959).
88 United States v. McElveen, 177 F. Supp. 355, 359-60 (1959).
89 United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10, 13 (E.D. La. 1960).
90 In re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 63 (M.D. Ala. 1959). In this case George C. Wallace,
Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alabama, impounded the voting records of certain Ala-
bama counties in defiance of the Civil Rights Commission's request to examine such records.
After rejecting the contention that the enforcement of the subpoenas would unconstitutionally
invade state sovereignty, the court ordered Wallace to make the records available to the Com-
mission. Id. at 70.
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of Registrars did not constitute a suable entity, and (3) the 1957 Act did not
authorize any civil rights action against the State.91
The government's experience with these few cases was no source of en-
couragement. In fact, the futility of government by lawsuit was becoming all
too apparent. The Civil Rights Commission's dissatisfaction over the delays
inherent in litigation was certainly apparent.92 As Anthony Lewis of the New
York Times wrote, "the most important single conclusion drawn by the com-
mission from its investigation is that lawsuits are a feeble, perhaps hopeless
weapon against these defenses of intimidation and evasion.""3 He continued:
Litigation case-by-case can hardly make a significant dent in
the hardened areas of resistance to Negro voting. Even the re-
sources of the Justice Department, albeit used freely by a weakly
led Civil Rights Division, have not succeeded in registering a single
Negro voter through litigation since the passage of the 1957 Civil
Rights Act permitting Justice Department intervention.9 4
Accordingly, in its first official report to the President and Congress, the
Civil Rights Commission recommended corrective measures intended to ob-
viate the problems of the Alabama decision, and measures which would rely
less on judicial and more on administrative action. Among its several recom-
mendations were proposals that the President appoint temporary federal
registrars who would be empowered to register would-be registrants in ac-
cordance with state qualification laws, after' certification by ihe Commission
that they had in fact been discriminated against in previous attempts to register
and vote for federal officials.95
After many days of hearings, long hours of congressional debate, and
weeks of relentless pleading by civil rights organizations, Congress finally passed
91 United States v. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala. 1959), aff'd United States v.
Alabama, 267 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 893. While the case was pend-
ing in the Supreme Court, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1960 which expressly
allowed the Attorney General to bring such suits against the State. Whereupon the Supreme
Court, without reaching the merits of the case, remanded it to District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama with instructions to reinstate the action as to the State of Alabama. United
States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960).
92 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS REPoRT 140.
93 N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1959, sec. IV, p. 6.
94 Ibid.
95 The Commission also recommended that (1) the Census Bureau be directed to compile
nationwide and territorial statistics regarding the total number of persons registered and voting
on the basis of race, color, and national origin, (2) Congress require all state registration and
voting records to be preserved for five years, (3) state officials be legally barred from prevent-
ing individuals to register, vote, and have their votes counted in any federal election, and (4)
the Commission be empowered to go directly to an appropriate federal district court for an
order enforcing its subpoenas. These proposals were based on the hard facts that (1) too little
information exists relative to nonvoting in the United States, (2) public records pertaining to
registration and voting are difficult to procure, owing in part to the total lack of uniform state
laws on the matter, (3) many persons were being denied the right to register and vote be-
cause state registration boards have failed to function for long periods of time and have failed
to enforce state registration laws, or have restricted registration to such short periods as to
prevent most citizens from registering, (4) effective administration of the Civil Rights Act is
hampered by the fact that the Commission has to call upon another governmental agency (Jus-
tice Department) to compel witnesses to comply with its orders, and (5) existing judicial
remedies under the Act of 1957 are insufficient. 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 134-42. Note
also Commissioner John S. Battles' dissent at 142. Commissioners John A. Hannah, Theodore
M. Hesburgh, and George M. Johnson joined in a separate statement recommending, in addi-
tion to the Commission proposals, a constitutional amendment to extend the right to vote to
every American citizen who meets state age and residence requirements. This, of course, would
eliminate all barriers to voting, including literacy tests of any kind. "An important aim of this
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the Civil Rights Act of 1960.98 Like any major piece of legislation this Act was
the result of intense interparty and intergroup negotiation.9" Much of the de-
bate in Congress, in the communications media, and among civil rights groups
centered on the relative merits and strengths of the Civil Rights Commission's
proposal for federal registrars as opposed to the Attorney General's plan for
voting referees. In fact, the division among civil rights groups over which
plan to support led to an interesting strategy conference between them and a
staff member of the Civil Rights Commission, 9 an incident which led some
Congressmen to question the Commission's objectivity.99 Most congressional
leaders realized, however, that the Eisenhower Administration's bill would have
to be accepted if any Civil Rights measure were to be enacted, and it was
especially propitious to pass such a measure in an election year and at a time
when the American Negro revolution was waxing strong. Supported by a coali-
tion of Republicans and Northern Democrats °0 the bill stopped about half-
way between Senator Hart's proposal to establish a congressional elections com-
mission to conduct elections in the states for senators and representatives 10 ' and
the insistence of Southern Democrats for retention of the status quo.
Specifically, the Act provided for court-appointed voting referees to register
voters in areas where patterns of racial discrimination are found to exist." 2
To facilitate finding such a pattern the Act further provided for the preserva-
tion of all registration and voting records for twenty-two months from the
date of any general, special, or primary election."0 3 Moreover, the government
amendment," the three Commissioners noted, "would be to remove the occasion for further
direct Federal intervention in the States' administration and conduct of elections by prohibit-
ing complex voting requirements and providing clear, simple, and easily enforceable standards."
Id. at 143-45. Commissioners Robert G. Storey and Doyle E. Carlton took exception to the
proposal on the ground that the same result could be achieved by law. Id. at 145.
96 74 Stat. 86 (1960).
97 For an excellent description of the political dynamics surrounding the Civil Rights Bill
from its introduction in Congress through final passage see BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES LAW
(1962).
98 N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1960, p. 1, col. 4.
99 See, e.g., Hearings on Voting Rights Before the House Committee on the judiciary, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, at 3-4 (1960).
100 13 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 559, 563 (1957).
101 S. 2535, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
102 74 Stat. 90 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. IV 1960). Under this section the
Attorney General is empowered to ask the court, in a case brought by him where the court
finds a person to have been deprived of the right to register or vote, to make a finding, after
the relevant parties have been duly notified and granted a hearing, "whether such deprivation
was or is pursuant to a pattern or practice [of discrimination]." If the court so finds, then any
person of that race living within the affected area will, after filing an application with a voting
referee, be entitled to a court order declaring him a qualified voter provided that he can show
that he is qualified to vote under the laws of the state and that he has been denied the right to
vote since the pattern of discrimination was made by the court. In order to establish whether
these conditions are met the court may appoint voting referees who receive these applications
and take all relevant evidence in ex parte hearings. The referee's findings are then submitted to
the court, copies are sent to the state attorney general and to every other party to the proceeding,
accompanied by an order to show cause, within ten days, why an order should not issue in
accordance with the report of the voting referee. The burden of proof is on the state to show
that the facts found by the referee are erroneous. If state law requires a literacy test prior to
being allowed to register to vote, the applicant's literacy is determined solely on the basis of
the answers the voting referee included in his report.
10 74 Stat. 88 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 1974 (Supp. IV, 1960). Upon a written demand by the
Attorney General or his representative, such records were to be made available for inspection,
reproduction, or copying and the district court was empowered to order the production of such
records.
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was expressly given the power to make the State a party to any action brought
under the civil rights statute.'" The voting referee proposal, pushed by the
Attorney General with the President's support, constituted an outright repudia-
tion of the federal registrar plan recommended by the Civil Rights Commis-
sion."' Together with official - and perhaps unwarranted - doubts about the
constitutionality of the Commission's plan1° the Justice Department, by rest-
ing its case for voting referees on the fifteenth amendment, insisted that state
as well as federal elections be covered by the legislation."'
Deputy Attorney General Lawrence E. Walsh, speaking for the Justice
Department, seemed to have made a telling point:
State elections must be included in the relief given by Con-
gress for many reasons; we cannot tolerate Jim Crow at the ballot
box. It would be ironic indeed if while Federal courts assert the
illegality of segregation in public schools, in railroad waiting rooms,
in parks, and on public golf courses, it is by Federal legislation ex-
pressly condoned in the voting place. State elections may be less
dramatic but they can in reality be more important than Federal
elections. They decide who will run the schools and who will en-
force the laws, who will select the juries, and who will be the local
judge. It is only in the right to vote in these elections that there
lies the kernel of hope for the ultimate eradication of racial
segregation and the long-awaited fulfillment of a basic promise
that the protection of the law shall be equal to all. 08
Yet the question remained whether the Attorney General's plan, or even the
Commission's unenacted federal registrar plan, constituted effective solutions
to the problem of discrimination at the polls. In either case the aggrieved
registrant would have to plod his way through a legal and judicial quagmire
to vindicate his right to vote. Under the 1960 Act voting referees are sent into
the field only after a federal district court finds a pattern of discrimination in
a given voting district. To appoint referees in an adjacent district where dis-
crimination is also practiced, still another trial, involving substantial proof
of discrimination by election officials, would be necessary. Also, under the Com-
mission's plan, the enlistment of federal registrars would have obtained only
after a finding of discrimination by the Commission in a quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding - which finding, incidentally, would have been reviewable by the
courts. The fact that lengthy lawsuits were required for the implementation of
104 74 Stat. 92 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (Supp. IV, 1960).
105 Bills to implement the federal registrar proposal were introduced shortly after the
Commission released its 1959 report by Senators Humphrey, Morse, and Javits. See S. 2684,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. 2719, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); and S. 2783, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960).
106 Since the Civil Rights Commission is not a quasi-judicial body, the Justice Department
questioned the constitutionality of the Commission making determinations regarding the con-
duct of individual registrars which could result in voting referees taking over the functions of
such registrars where federal elections are concerned. See Statement of Deputy Attorney General
Lawrence E. Walsh, Hearings On Voting Rights, supra note 99, at 3, 41. See also President
Eisenhower's comment in a Washington news conference. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1960, p. 18,
col. 4.
107 Hearings on Voting Rights, supra note 99, at 12, 41. The Justice Department also
alleged that there was no assurance that a person would be allowed to vote in a federal election
once registered by the federal registrar. The referee plan on the other hand would allow the
voting referee to attend the polls to actually insure that discrimination is not practiced.
108 Id. at 45.
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both plans led Professor Robert J. Harris of the University of Michigan Law
School to predict that "they are virtually certain to become dead letters once
enacted. At most, they will accomplish token registration in a handful of
isolated voting districts.' 10 9
III. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
Though hardly calculated to bring a free and untrammeled suffrage to
the entire South, the Civil Rights Acts were not dead letters. At this writing
the Justice Department has instituted approximately 45 suits under the Acts"0
although only six were filed prior to February 1961." The relative paucity
of suits filed by the Justice Department under the 1957 Act was a reflection
of the difficulty experienced in gaining access to voter registration records kept
by uncooperative and hostile southern state officials. Title III of the Civil
Rights Act of 1960, providing for the preservation, production, and inspection
of voting records, has accordingly facilitated enforcement proceedings. The
difference in the respective records of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administra-
tions in instituting voting suits may have reflected the latter's greater ability
to do business with southern politicians since the Republican Party, as Richard
Longaker puts it, "did not have the advantage of informal communication
with party leaders in the South.""' 2
According to the Attorney General's 1962 report active investigations of
alleged violations of Sections 1971 (a) and 1971 (b) were being conducted
in 45 and 17 counties respectively." Moreover, Justice Department demands
for inspection of voting records under Title III of the 1960 Act were made in
37 counties and parishes while many more such demands were being con-
templated for 1963."' In only 13 of these jurisdictions was resort to the courts
necessary for the production of such records for inspection and copying."'
It should be pointed out, however, that the budgetary and human
resources of the Civil Rights Division are severely limited. Since the Division
is responsible for the enforcement of many civil rights, it is simply not equipped
to launch a massive legal assault in every local community where the Civil
Rights Commission has found racial discrimination in voting. Its probing opera-
tions are concentrated in selected critical areas where the Division's energies
are mobilized to gather evidence preparatory to filing suit in one of the federal
courts. This is done with a meticulous regard for facts and the peculiar cir-
cumstances surrounding each case. The labor which goes into these cases was
recently described as follows:
The nature of these [voting] cases is illustrated by United
States v. Penton. . . . The suit was filed in August 1961 against
109 N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1960, p. 28, col. 8.
110 On July 18, 1963, Attorney General Kennedy testified that 42 suits had been filed under
the 1957 and 1960 Acts. Hearings on S. 1731 and S. 1750 Before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1963). A check of the Civil Liberties Docket discloses several
additional filings by the Justice Department since that time.
III See 1962 ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 162.
112 Longaker, The President and the Civil Rights of Negroes, 1962 AMERTCAN GOV'T
ANN. 61.
113 1962 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 165.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
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the registrars of voters of Montgomery County, Alabama, and
against the State of Alabama. Investigation showed that in 1960
some 63,000 white persons and 33,000 Negro persons of voting age
lived in the county, yet as of December 1961, there were 33,846
white persons but only 3,760 Negroes registered to vote. An analysis
of the registrars' records showed that between January 1956 and
June 1961, 13,900 applications for registration were filed with the
board of registrars. Overall, 96.6% of the applications of white per-
sons were approved and 75.4% of the applications of Negroes
were rejected. Staff attorneys, both in the office and in the field,
analyzed and correlated the records available, interviewed wit-
nesses, prepared and argued motions, and made all other necessary
preparations for the trial which lasted five days in January 1962.
The Government called 87 witnesses, the defense about 100. The
Government introduced 69 exhibits. One exhibit consisted of five
filing cabinets containing over 10,000 documents, all of them
thoroughly indexed, analyzed and processed. The Division then filed
a largely factual brief of 293 pages and attachment volumes de-
picting graphically and statistically every item of the many facets
of racial discrimination that characterized registration in that county
in recent years. The case was awaiting decision at the end of the
fiscal year. 11
Calling upon the federal courts for assistance in the enforcement of the Civil
Rights Acts is, however, always a last resort. Conciliation and negotiation are,
as a matter of course, the initial instruments applied by the Civil Rights Di-
vision. 17
The enforcement policy of the Division was facilitated considerably by
court approval of the 1960 Act. In Dinkens v. Attorney GeneraP" the validity
of Title III of the 1960 Act, providing for the inspection of state voting records,
was sustained against federal constitutional objections by the State of Alabama.
In that case the Attorney General sought a court order requiring the Mont-
gomery County, Alabama Board of Registrars to produce voting records for
inspection by U. S. officials, after which the state attorney general obtained
a temporary restraining order from a state court forbidding the former to in-
spect or copy such records in any county in the state."' The action was re-
moved to a federal district court where the two proceedings were consolidated.
Observing that the inspection of voting records was a necessary step in pro-
tecting the right to vote against debasement on account of racial discrimina-
116 Id. at 162.
117 To prove and prevent these violations of law, the Department conducts
investigations where there are indications that the right of Negroes to vote is
being interfered with by discrimination or intimidation. These investiga-
tions involve a thorough analysis of the registration and voting records of
the counties involved and extensive interviews with persons in the county. If
it is concluded that discrimination has occurred, the Department makes
every effort to correct the illegal practices by bringing them to the attention
of state and local officials and by exploring, in advance of litigation, all
possibilities of self-correction. This policy of the Attorney General has been
followed in all instances. Where negotiation is unavailing, a suit is filed
under Section 1971. Id. at 161.
118 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1961).
119 5 RAcE REL. L. REP. 766 (1960).
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tion,"2 ' the court regarded Title III as appropriate legislation under the fif-
teenth amendment 121 since it constituted "an effective means whereby pre-
liminary investigations of registration practices can be made in order to de-
termine whether or not such practices conform to constitutional principles."' 22
The argument that Title III violated the Ex Post Facto Clause was rejected
in United States v. Association of Citizens Councils of Louisiana.'23
It was alleged by the State of Louisiana that the 1960 Act delegated a
non-judicial function to the federal courts and injected them into a matter
which cannot properly be regarded as a "case or controversy" under Article
III ;124 it was also contended that the 1960 Act violated the Tenth Amend-
ment. 5 A three-judge federal district court ruled against the state on all three
points. Because the Civil Rights Act interferes with a state's power to regulate
elections does not mean that it violates the Tenth Amendment. In so ruling the
court was emphasizing an old and rather elementary Marshallian doctrine that
the Tenth Amendment is no bar to the legitimate exercise of implied or ex-
press powers, for to say "that a congressional act is unconstitutional because
it interferes with the reserved powers of the states . . . is 'an objection to
the Constitution itself.' "120 Since congressional control over federal elections
is clearly implied by Article I, Section 4, Congress may employ all means "nec-
essary and proper" for protecting the integrity of those elections. And the
court emphatically maintained that the act of registering to vote is an indi-
visible part of the electoral process.'2 7 Since the act of registration, moreover,
applies both to state and federal elections, "any interference with the qualified
voter's right to register is therefore interference with a federal election."' 28
In pointing to the significance of the registration process, the court said:
The Civil Rights Act of 1960 is based on the fact, obvious to
120 The same court, in In re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 63 (M.D. Ala. 1959), stated:
The authority delegated to the Federal Government by the Fifteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is undoubtedly the
authority under which the Congress of the United States was acting when
the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was passed. The provision in the Act providing
for investigation of alleged discriminatory practices, including inspection of
voting and other pertinent records, must be considered to be an essential
step in the process of enforcing and protecting the right to vote regardless
of color, race, religion, or national origin. That part of the Act is, therefore,
by the Court considered "appropriate legislation" within the meaning of
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 67.
121 State ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Ala. 1960), aff'd per curiam
285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1961). See also United States v. Hildreth, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 185
(N.D. Ala. 1961); In re Palmer, 5 RACE RFL. L. REP. 774 (E.D. La. 1960); Kennery v.
Bruce, 298 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1962).
122 State ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848, 853 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
123 The court per curiam said: "We find no violation of this clause [ex post facto) since
Section 301 operates only prospectively and not retrospectively as to any criminal prosecu-
tion. It is well settled, of course, that the prohibition against ex post facto legislation applies
only to criminal proceedings and not to civil matters, such as this." United States v. Association
of Citizens Councils of Louisiana, 187 F. Supp. 846, 847-48 (W.D. La. 1960).
124 United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. La. 1963).
125 In an earlier case, a statutory three-judge federal district court held that the tenth
amendment, limited as it is by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, was not violated by
the fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1960 authorized a federal district judge to sign a certifi-
cate indicating that a specific person is qualified to vote. United States v. Manning, 206 F.
Supp. 623 (W.D. La. 1962).
126 United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 283 (W.D. La. 1963).
127 Id. at 284.
128 Ibid.
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all, that violations of suffrage rights are "usually accomplished
through discriminatory application and administration of state
registration laws." In adopting the Act, Congress attempted to
preserve the integrity of elections at its most significant point -
the Registration Office. The registration of voters is relatively
modern. For the "original understanding" of Section 4 to have
meaning today, "manner of holding elections" therefore must be
read as referring to the entire electoral process, from the first step
of registering to the last step, the State's promulgation of honest
returns.
12 9
The court held, accordingly, that the 1960 Act constituted "appropriate legisla-
tion" under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, for it was clearly intended
to guarantee to qualified voters the right to register and vote. 3 ' Furthermore,
states' rights were hardly infringed by the Act since no attempt was made to
establish voter qualifications or to substitute federal for state registrars.ul But the
court did not suggest that there are constitutional bars to any federal registrar
plan.
Against the objection that 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) compels the court to
exercise non-judicial functions, the court answered that a judicial determina-
tion as to whether particular individuals are qualified to vote is made only
as a result of a lawsuit in which "the court makes legal decisions and renders
judgment after passing on issues of fact and law."'"2 Nor does the use of voting
referees thrust the court improperly into the arena of administration, for the
court draws upon a whole list of precedents to show that the appointment of
analogous officers like masters, referees in bankruptcy, and receivers are in
line with the traditional authority exercised by courts of equity.' The voting
referee is simply an investigative officer who reports his findings to the court
which then makes a determination on the basis of these findings whether an
individual applicant is being unconstitutionally denied the right to register and
vote. 3 4 Finally, the objection that the court's obligation to find a pattern or
practice of discrimination was not an adversary proceeding, was emphatically
rejected. This argument, resting upon a misconception of the nature of suits
arising under the 1960 act, is not a controversy between Negroes and the
State, but rather between the State and the United States. As guardian of the
public interest, the United States brings suit in its own name to vindicate
not just the rights of certain Negroes, but the "public interest in the constitu-
tional right of all citizens to be free from racial discrimination in exercising
voting rights."'3
5
Positive results were achieved in several of the suits filed by the Justice
Department, even though when measured against the extent of racial dis-
crimination in voting, these results were disappointing. Since 1957 it appears
that about 6,000 Negroes have actually been registered as a direct result of
129 Ibid.
130 Id. at 289.
131 Ibid.
132 Id. at 290.
133 Id. at 292.
134 Id. at 294.
135 Id. at 295.
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court action.' But in several instances the courts have been reluctant to
issue orders or have altogether denied the Government's request for temporary
injunctions against discriminatory acts by registrars,3 7 and have occasionally
construed the Civil Rights Acts so narrowly as to defeat their broad purposes.'
Though voter registration records are now available upon demand by the At-
torney General, the achievements of the Civil Rights Division under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 offer little hope for great expectations. In several cases federal district
courts have refused to make a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination.
For example, after making innumerable findings of discrimination in registra-
tion in Terrell County, Georgia, and after enjoining the continuation of these
discriminatory practices, 3 ' the court did not consider itself bound to make a
finding under 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) that a pattern or practice of discrimination
existed. 4 As a matter of equitable discretion the court chose not to do so on
the assumption that the original injunctions were being obeyed. As a matter of
policy the court said: "in order to preserve a healthy federalism no more find-
ings and decrees should be made in this area of conflict between federal law
and state action than are necessary."'' But the court retained jurisdiction of
the case so as not to prejudice the right of the United States to seek such a
finding in the event of any subsequent violation of the court's decrees.'42 We
would note parenthetically that as a result of slowdown tactics adopted by
the registrars only some 50 Negroes have been registered in Terrell County
since the court's original decree.'
In the few instances where the court has found a pattern or practice
of discrimination to exist no voting referees have yet been appointed. Instead,
the court has elected to issue comprehensive decrees providing for extensive
judicial supervision of the conduct and behavior of local registrars. For ex-
ample, in one instance, after ordering the registration of 54 specified Negro
citizens in Macon County, Alabama," the court required monthly reports of
the "dates and places of holding voter registration, the name, race, and date
of every application received, and action taken by the Registrars, and the date
the certificate of registration was mailed or notification of rejection sent."' 45
The decree required that copies of all notifications of rejection accompany the
136 See 1963 U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGTS RExP. 37-50.
137 See, e.g., United States v. Daniel, Civil No. 1655, S.D. Miss., Jan. 4, 1963, 8 RAcE
REL. L. REP. 154 (1963); United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Lynd, 321 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Atkins, 210 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.
Ala. 1962), rev'd, 323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Wood, 6 RAcE REL. L. REP.
1069 (S.D. Miss.), rev'd, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Board of Educa-
tion of Greene County, 7 RAcE REL. L. REP. 770 (S.D. Miss. 1962); United States v. Edwards,
Sheriff, Civil No. 3413 (Jackson Div.), S.D. Miss., April 1, 1963.
138 See, e.g., United States v. Dogan, 206 F. Supp. 446 (N.D. Miss. 1962), rev'd, 314
F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1963) and United States v. Duke, Civil No. 4561, N.D. Miss., June 23, 1963.
139 United States v. Raines, 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. 1960).
140 United States v. Raines, 203 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Ga. 1961).
141 Id. at 151.
142 Id. at 152.
143 1963 U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 39.
144 United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 583
(5th Cir. 1962). In this case the court held that the court's power is not limited to preven-
tive relief, but that mandatory relief is permitted by the statute and is within the court's equity
powers.
145 Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 1962).
THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
report and also prescribed that voting records should be open to inspection by
federal officials from whom the court required similar monthly reports. 4 ' Month-
ly progress reports were also required in United States v. Manning,4" where
the court ordered certain registrars to accept drivers' licenses and other un-
specified records as proof of registrants' identification after striking down as
violative of the fifteenth amendment the practice that applicants for registra-
tion establish their identity by being known personally by the registrar or by
being identified by a registered white voter. An all-pervasive decree was also
issued in Montgomery County, Alabama, where a federal district court found
that some 1,070 Negroes had been denied registration on account of their race
even though qualified to register and vote under state law. 48
With reference to the enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts the Civil
Rights Commission noted that "the only way to eliminate the [discriminatory]
practices by litigation is to win comprehensive decrees with intensive reporting
requirements so that literally every act of every registrar is known to the
court." " But this is a herculean task for any court.
Yet the record is not entirely bleak. The federal government has
achieved notable victories in knocking out segregated voting facilities. For
example, the Bibb County, Georgia Democratic Executive Committee had
established separate polling places and voting machines for Negro and white
voters in addition to tabulating and publishing election returns on a racially
designated basis - practices which were held to violate the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments as well as the Civil Rights Acts. 5 ' Earlier, in a private suit,
the court had declared similar practices in violation of the same constitutional
and statutory provisions. 5' And very recently, the Supreme Court struck down
as clearly contravening the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection Clause a
Louisiana statute requiring the race xf candidates to be designated on all elec-
tion ballots; the vice here was "in the placing of the power of the State be-
hind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls."'52
In still other cases several hundred Negroes have been restored to registra-
tion rolls after their status as voters had been successfully challenged by local
citizen groups in cooperation with certain public officials. A typical case is
United States v. Wilder. 5' There the White Citizens' Council of Jackson Parish,
Louisiana challenged the registration status of over eighty-five per cent of the
Negro voters in the parish with the result that by August 31, 1962, some 5,613
persons, representing about eighty-four per cent of eligible white voters, and
478 Negroes, representing only eighteen per cent of eligible Negroes, were
registered to vote. This contrasts with the 2,535 Negroes on the registration
146 Ibid.
147 205 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. La. 1962).
148 United States v. Penton, 212 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
149 1963 U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTs REP. 24.
150 United States v. Bibb County Democratic Executive Committee, 222 F. Supp. 493
(M.D. Ga. 1962). Accord, United States v. Jones County Democratic Executive Committee,
Civil No. 1905, M.D. Ga., June 26, 1963, 8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1091 (1963). Cf. Sharp. v.
Lucky, 252 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1958).
151 Anderson v. Courson, 203 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
152 Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964). Cf. McDonald v. Key, 224 F.2d 608
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 895 (1955).
153 222 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. La. 1963).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
rolls in 1960. Errors, omissions, and handwriting differences on the original
application cards constituted the basis for the challenges against Negroes, but
these deficiencies did not work to disfranchise several thousand white voters
many of whom were guilty of similar irregularities. Having found the purge
in violation of the Civil Rights Act and the Constitution, the court ordered
the reinstatement of 953 Negroes removed from the current roll of qualified
voters.' In an interesting state case the Florida Supreme Court struck down
a state statute as violative of the state and federal constitutions for not provid-
ing the elements of due process of law, namely notice and hearing, prior to
striking the name of a qualified voter from the registration books.'55
Another impediment to Negro registration is the so-called voucher re-
quirement. In Bullock County, Alabama, for example, the disparity in voter
registration between white and Negro residents was perpetuated by the fact
that each applicant for registration was required to have a registered voter
vouch for him and by the fact that no registered voter was permitted to vouch
for more than two applicants in any one year. In United States v. Alabama..6
the practice was held unconstitutional and violative of the Civil Rights Act.
There have also been several instances of intimidation and reprisals against
Negroes rash enough to decide to vote. Three cases which gave rise to a good
deal of publicity in the nation's press originated in Tennessee. These cases, in-
cidentally, were the first to be filed by the Civil Rights Division under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (b)."' In Haywood County, Tennessee, several individuals, landowners,
merchants, banks, and corporations retaliated against Negroes registering to vote
or attempting to do so by resorting to devices such as terminating employment,
refusing to sell goods, give credit, or lend money, evicting tenants, and other
economic penalties. A consent judgment was finally entered on May 2, 1962,
prohibiting these discriminatory acts.' Similarly, in United States v. At-
keison,"' certain landowners of Fayette County, Tennessee, were enjoined from
evicting Negro tenants who decided to vote. Another interesting case arose in
Walthall County, Mississippi, where a Negro was prosecuted in a state pro-
ceeding for breach of peace after he set up a voter registration school in the
county. The Justice Department maintained that the prosecution would in-
timidate Negro residents of the county by discouraging Negroes from registering
to vote, and on that ground sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
proceeding. 6 In overruling the federal district court's refusal to stay the state
criminal proceeding the Court of Appeals noted that the alleged coercion in-
volved in this case was of the kind the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was intended
154 Id. at 754.
155 Florida ex rel. Barancik v. Gates, 134 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1961).
156 Civil No. 1677-N, M.D. Ala., Sept. 13, 1961, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 1146 (1962). Cf.
United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. La. 1962).
157 See 1961 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 189-90.
158 United States v. Beaty, Civil No. 4065, W.D. Tenn., May 2, 1962, 7 RACE REL. L. REP.
484 (1962) and United States v. Barcroft, Civil No. 4121, W.D. Tenn., May 2, 1962, 7 RACE
REL. L. REP. 484 (1962).
159 Civil No. 4131, W.D. Tenn., Dec. 30, 1960, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 200 (1961). Cf.
United States v. Deal, Civil No. 8132, W.D. La., Feb. 3, 1961, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 474
(1961).
160 United States v. Wood, Civil No. 1670, S.D. Miss., Sept. 21, 1961, 6 RACE REL. L.
REP. 1069 (1961).
THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
to reach."6 1 But in United States v. Board of Education of Greene County,16 2
a federal district court ruled that the failure of a school board to rehire, after
the expiration of a one-year contract, a teacher who had participated in a voter
registration campaign and lawsuit, would not result in the intimidation of Ne-
groes seeking to register to vote. Additional cases involving intimidation and
coercion under 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) are now pending in the federal courts.'6 3
These cases, however, are exceptions to the rule. Federal court action,
as suggested above, has not brought about significant increases in Negro regis-
tration in the South. In this connection it must be remembered that the Civil
Rights Acts are being interpreted and applied by federal district courts lo-
cated in the South and presided over by native southerners, some of whom
view these Acts with revulsion. The significance of this fact should not be
overlooked, for judges do not shed their prejudices when they don judicial
robes. Southern federal court judges who share the sentiments of their home
communities can be as obstructionist as the most volatile southern politician.
Accordingly, the Civil Rights Acts, while generating meaningful results in
some judicial districts, have become dead letters in others. It is not surprising,
therefore, to learn that some voting rights cases which were filed in 1961 are
today still pending in the federal courts. Another interesting aspect of the
problem is the interplay between certain southern federal district courts and
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which often appears to be like a chess
game where the appellate court is continually checking the diversionary tactics
of the district courts but without a checkmate.
A vivid example of the obstruction which can be wrought by a federal
district court took place in Mississippi. On August 11, 1960 the Civil Rights
Division requested the Registrar of Forrest County, Mississippi, to produce
voting records in his possession for inspection and copying. Upon the Registrar's
refusal to do so, Justice Department officials, on January 19, 1961, sought an
order in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for their
production under Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960. For six months
the Court failed to grant such an order. Accordingly, on July 6, 1961, the
United States brought a second action in the court, this time for a temporary
injunction to end discriminatory practices against Negroes in Forrest County.
When this action was instituted, and after a further delay of six months, the
prior proceeding was dismissed February 15, 1962, on technical grounds. Final-
ly, after several dilatory motions and much temporizing, the motion for a
temporary injunction was set down for hearing on March 1, 1962. Extensive
testimony was taken, showing several acts of discrimination against Negroes in
the county. But when the United States completed its case the court granted
a recess over the government's objection in order to permit Mississippi and
registrar Lynd to file answer to the charges made at the hearing. The govern-
161 United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961).
162 Civil No. 1729, S.D. Miss., Aug. 30, 1962, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 770 (1962).
163 See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, Civil No. 516, M.D. Ga., Aug. 14, 1963; United
States v. Edwards, Sheriff, Civil No. 3413, (Jackson Div.) S.D. Miss. 1963; United States v. City
of Greenwood, Civil No. GC638, N.D. Miss., April 1, 1963.
164 See, the list and disposition of federal litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a) and §
1971(b) in 1963 U.S. CoMM. ON CIVIL IIGHTS REP. 37-50.
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ment then moved in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
for the temporary injunction, pending an appeal from the refusal of the dis-
trict court to grant the injunction on the merits." 5 Thus it took fifteen months
from the time of the original action to get a temporary injunction that should
have issued, according to Kennedy v. Bruce, 6 as a matter of course.
To obviate many of these problems which we have been discussing
the Civil Rights Commission in its 1961 and 1963 reports put forth some in-
teresting and novel proposals. To adequately evaluate these proposals, how-
ever, it is necessary to have some understanding of the general socio-political
context in which they were offered. Therefore, the specific nature and scope
of the problem of racial discrimination against Negroes in voting will be con-
sidered.
IV. SOUTHERN POLITICs AND NEGRO VOTING
Since the end of Reconstruction the South has been dominated by one-
party rule, historically the most important and salient characteristic of southern
politics. Economic cleavages, like the conflict between landowners and poor
farmers, might have provided a basis for bipartisan competition in the South,
but the cohesion and solidarity generated by the race question were sufficient
to overcome all threats to the undiluted hegemony of the Southern Democratic
Party.'67 The Negro's relegation to a condition of political subordination was
largely an accomplished fact by 1880,, following a systematic and successful
effort to disfranchise him.' Indeed, white supremacy and absolute Democratic
Party control were largely synonymous.
As a consequence, politics in the South has tended to resolve into rivalries
among personalities and contests between intraparty factional groups. These
contests are usually won or lost in primary elections, the only meaningful
elections in the South. It should be noted that the primary was partly an out-
growth of the breakdown in two-party competitive politics. As Professor Key
puts it, "if governors and other officials were to be popularly elected, they had
to be elected, in effect, by a direct primary within the Democratic Party."'"
The relevance of this fact to the quantitative and qualitative aspects of Southern
voting behavior should not be overlooked. Political scientists have long held
to the theory that "one-partyism" is incompatible with party responsibility
since it tends to drive political issues and principles into the background of a
political campaign while attention is focused on personalities and factional
conflict. Deprived, therefore, of the opportunity to make a meaningful choice
at the ballot box in the general election, the citizen is often inclined not to vote.
Students of American voting behavior have confirmed these impressions. Pro-
fessor Ewing, in his study of primary elections, found voter participation much
lower in primaries in the South than in the primaries of other states. 70 In
tabulating the returns of southern state elections for 1920-46, Professor Key
also found that less than thirty per cent of all eligible voters had participated
165 United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1962).
166 298 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1962).
167 See FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 328-38 (1960).
168 Id. at 328-34.
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in Democratic primaries for governor; in five states the participation level fell
below twenty per cent."' It should be noted that the authors are speaking of
white voters, not Negroes. Key found that "in most states of the South the
rate of participation by whites fell far below the rates for the total voting popu-
lation in two-party states."'" 2 He estimated that about 4,900,000 additional
southern whites would have voted in their 1940 gubernatorial primaries had
they shown the same level of interest of voters in the median nonsouthem state
in that presidential year." 3 Professor Key also suggested that the relative iso-
lation of the South from presidential politics - though this may not be as true
today"" - was one result of low voter turnout in southern elections.' Thus,
a distinctive pattern of politics seems to have emerged from the subordinate
relationship of the southern Negro to the southern white. Professor Key put it
this way:
Low citizen-interest in voting in the South is both a cause and
an effect. Absence of a presidential contest, the nature of suffrage
restrictions, and Negro disfranchisement result in low turnout of
voters. The habit of nonvoting grows and the electorate by cus-
tom becomes limited. The limited electorate, in turn, influences
the nature of factional politics within the Democratic party by
practically eliminating from the voting population substantial blocs
of citizens whose political interests and objectives, if activated,
would furnish the motive power for important political movements
and demands. 7 6
It is one of the ironies of southern political history that in driving the Negro
into political submission many a southern white has experienced a paralysis
of his own political consciousness.
However helpful and useful court actions and legal sanctions might be
in banishing the evils of discrimination in voting, all this would seem to
indicate that the ultimate solution to the depressed condition of the American
Negro in housing, employment, education, as well as in other aspects of his
social existence, is to be a political one, which is why the right to vote is so
critical. While it is not certain that admission of the Negro to the political
system will automatically open the door to general socio-economic opportunity
and first-class citizenship, it is certain that the latter will never be achieved
without the former.
The Pattern of Southern Resistance
The barriers to the Negro's integration into the mainstream of American
life have been coming down - slowly and painfully to be sure, but nonethe-
171 KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS 492 (1949). Imy, op. cit. supra note 169 at 492.
172 Id. at 505.
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less coming down. The great symbol of those falling barriers in this century
was the Supreme Court's historical school desegregation decision of ten years
ago. That decision set in motion the forces which brought about the Civil Rights
Acts of 1957 and 1960, and which now constitute the major stimulus behind
the current civil rights bill before Congress. But the Negro's determination to
secure his rights, particularly his right to vote, is being met by the equal deter-
mination in certain states and localities to retain the structure of white political
supremacy. For the most part, this is being done behind the facade of states'
rights and frequently in outright defiance of federal authority.
The first bricks of the South's wall of official resistance to federal initia-
tives in civil rights were laid in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.'
A climate of defiance, bound to influence southern political behavior patterns,
was first created with the passage of several state resolutions of interposition
and nullification.' The desegregation decision and other advances on the
civil rights front were nearly all won in the courts, principally with the sup-
port and financial backing of the NAACP's Legal Defense and Educational
Fund. 9 With the NAACP as the obvious and principal target, several state
laws against barratry and champerty were redefined to bar the activities of
that organization.' At least three southern states have created State Sover-
eignty Commissions to devise ways and means of circumventing federal direc-
tives in the civil rights field.' And most recently the atmosphere of intimida-
tion was further charged by reports that several state agencies in Alabama have
been collecting information on civil rights advocates at the direction of Gover-
nor George C. Wallace." 2
It was in this context of defiance of federal law that several southern states
proceeded to tighten up their voter registration laws so as to avoid the effects
of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. Georgia, for example, rewrote her
laws pertaining to registration by drafting an exceedingly difficult citizenship
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XX (1956); Ala. Act No. 42, Special Session (1956); Miss. Senate Concurrent Resolution
No. 125 (1956); Va. Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 (1956); La. House Concurrent Resolu-
tion No. 10 (1956); Tenn. House Resolution No. 9 (1957); S.C. Act of Feb. 14, 1956; 1 RACE
REL. L. REP. 443 (1956).
179 See GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAw 37-39 (1959).
180 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4701 (Supp. 1963); MIss. CODE ANN. § 2049-01 (1942);
S.C. CODE § 16-521-523 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-388 (1950). In proposing legislation
to abolish the NAACP Georgia's Attorney General Eugene Cook said: "It has been demon-
strated beyond any doubt that the NAACP is an enemy of the South, that it is the most potent
enemy of our segregated system of public schools, and that its leadership represents its most
effective sponsors of insidious and unconstitutional civil rights measures. The legislatures and
appropriate state officials of every Southern state should unite in an all-out fight to liquidate
this particular enemy of the South and constitutional government." See 1 RACE REL. L. REP.
957 (1956). In 1956 South Carolina enacted a law prohibiting the employment by the state
or any school district any member of the NAACP. The NAACP was described as being "so
insidious in its propaganda and the fostering of those ideas designed to produce a constant state
of turmoil between the races, that membership in such an organization is wholly incompatible
with the peace, tranquillity and progress that all citizens have a right to enjoy." S.C. Act No.
741 (1956), repealed by S.C. Act No. 223 (1957). As to the right of the NAACP to organize
and function in a state see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
181 Miss. House Bill No. 880 (1956), 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 592 (1956); Ark. Act No. 83
(1957), 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 491 (1957); La. Act No. 18 (1960), 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 893
(1960).
182 N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1964, p. 1, col. 2.
THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
test and adding certain new sections of such a technical nature that they were
very susceptible to discriminatory application. 88 In 1961, Alabama imposed
a citizenship test in addition to the literacy test previously required and then,
without ordering a complete new registration, provided that any person seek-
ing to register after January 1, 1962, would have to submit to both the literacy
and the citizenship tests.'84 With the addition of eighteen new sections to her
registration and elections code, Mississippi made it much more difficult to
register'85 in addition to requiring electors to demonstrate proof of good moral
character. 8 One provision requires the publication of the names and addresses
of applicants for registration in local newspapers. 8  Within fourteen days of
publication any qualified elector may then challenge the good moral character
of any applicant; if such a challenge is made the applicant, after notifica-
tion, is to appear on a specified date, time, and place where the registrar will
hold a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the challenge." It takes little
imagination to recognize the possibilities of abuse in these provisions.
Perhaps even more repressive than discrimination by the state is the climate
of fear often created by unofficial lawlessness on the part of private citizens. In a
few southern counties Negroes participating in voter registration drives have
been personally assaulted, 8" have had rifle shots fired into their homes,' and
have seen their homes'9 and churches 92 burned. In October, 1961, Dr. Martin
Luther King announced that "an apparent reign 'of terror" was being waged
against Negroes in two Mississippi counties for taking part in a voter registra-
tion drive. 9 Even Southern whites have been subjected to the wrath of their
neighbors for resisting state segregation policies. 94
The Scope of Discrimination
While tremendous gains have been made in recent decades to increase
Negro registration the fact is that thousands of Negroes are disfranchised. The
Civil Rights Commission reports that widespread discrimination against Negroes
seeking to vote is being practiced in at least 100 counties of eight states -
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee 95 - which counties contain nearly a third of all
Negroes of voting age in eleven southern states. 98 In his testimony before the
Judiciary Committee of the Senate, Attorney General Robert Kennedy reported
that there are at least 193 counties in the United States in which less than
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fifteen per cent of the eligible Negroes are registered to vote.'97 In at least 129
counties in ten states where Negroes constitute a substantial proportion of the
population, the Civil Rights Commission found that less than ten per cent of
eligible Negroes are registered." 8 In seventeen representative black belt counties
where Negroes constitute a majority of the population only about three per
cent were found to be registered.' 99
Alabama is a typical example of these conditions. Of sixty-seven counties
for which voting statistics were available it was found that no Negroes were
registered in two counties, under five per cent of eligible Negroes were regis-
tered in ten, under ten per cent in twelve, under twenty per cent in sixteen,
and under thirty per cent in thirteen counties. Only in fourteen counties were
Negroes registered in excess of thirty per cent. This contrasts with the regis-
tration of well over sixty per cent of the whites of voting age in fifty-three of
the counties."' The situation is even worse in Mississippi where, in 42 out of
69 counties for which statistics were available, less than 10 per cent of voting
age Negroes were registered.2 0
1
It is, of course, a little hazardous to draw a causal connection between state
restrictions on voting and nonvoting among Negroes. While the incidence of
nonvoting among Negroes is undoubtedly related to legal restrictions on voting,
community sentiment and even religious and cultural values2 2 may operate
to inhibit Negro voting. This seems to be indicated by the fact, as the authors
of The American Voter point out, that Negroes living in areas of high Negro
density fail to vote, regardless of how stringent or lenient state laws or prac-
tices may be.2"' On the other hand, the incidence of nonvoting among Negroes
is less in areas where the Negro population is smaller. Yet, whether in areas
of low or high Negro density nonvoting is still much more prevalent among
Negroes than whites.0 4
The reasons given by the Civil Rights Commission in explaining non-
voting among Negroes are compelling, and tie in with what was said at the
beginning of this article about the political effects of the Negro's alienation
from society. They merit full quotation:
[T]he Negro's depressed and dependent economic condition
continually operates to reinforce his subordinate political and social
position, and may contribute to lack of motivation to participate
in political matters. Another partial explanation may lie in the
very fact that Negroes have for so long been excluded from any
participation in the governmental process. Thus both habit and
lack of any visible rewards to be gained by casting a vote in an elec-
tion where they have no say in the selection of candidates, and the
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candidates make no effort to seek their vote or even to bring the
issues before them, may lead to Negro "apathy" in many of the
nonvoting counties; and this "apathy," in turn, may tend to per-
petuate their exclusion from the political process. In the voting
counties, on the other hand, the fact that Negroes can make their
weight felt, at least to some degree, and can see some fruits of their
participation in the franchise, may also be not only the effect of
that participation, but a cause of it. Finally, the absence of a viable
two-party system, with its vigorous competition (including registra-
tion drives) for uncommitted votes, may contribute to political
passivity
2 0 5
The Case of Louisiana
After Reconstruction, Louisiana succeeded, like several other southern
states, in disfranchising the Negro. Decades later, when the School Segrega-
tion Cases of 1954 threatened its structure of white supremacy, Louisiana offi-
cially renewed her determination "to maintain segregation of the races in all
phases of our life in accordance with the customs, traditions, and laws of our
State.121' A Joint Committee of the Louisiana Legislature was created for the
specific purpose of devising methods and proposing plans for resisting the in-
cursion of federal authority in the broad area of civil rights, including voting.
2 °1
A massive array of official energy was mobilized to continue denying - or at
least to minimize - the Negro's potential at the ballot box, not to mention
the efforts of powerful private groups, like the Association of Citizens Councils
of Louisiana, to purge the names of Negro citizens from voter registration rolls.
Recognizing the critical importance of the voting registrar, the state legis-
lature enacted several laws affecting his conduct and functions. One statute
was a firm reminder to registrars that all state laws relative to voter registration
and elections were to be complied with "faithfully and without reservation of
conscience or mind."2 ° The-state attorney general was designated the legal
advisor of all voting registrars, 0 9 and in the event that they become involved
in federal litigation under the civil rights statutes their salaries would continue
while absent from work.2 10 In addition to a literacy, good character, and con-
stitutional interpretation test already on the statute books,2 "' the legislature
added a requirement that prospective voters "understand the duties and-obliga-
tions of citizenship under a republican form of government."21 2  Moreover,
the Louisiana Constitution was amended to render common-law marriage,
parentage of illegitimate children, or a six-month' sentence for committing a
misdemeanor evidence of bad character,2 13 in which case 'one could be denied
the right to vote for not being of good character. A new registration form was
also devised requiring some twenty-eight specific replies - such as ward and
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precinct numbers, occupation, color, sex, parish residence, together with pre-
cise information on the years, months, and even days of the voter's age, and
other like matters. This form must be filled out by the applicant without as-
sistanceY4 The registration laws also provide that (1) the registrar may require
an applicant to produce two credible registered voters of his precinct to iden-
tify him as the person he claims to be,"' s (2) any two registered voters can
challenge the registration status of other voters, 16 and (3) if challenged, the
applicant must appear in person before the registrar at a specified time and
place."' All of these provisions lend themselves to discriminatory application.
The Civil Rights Commission pointed out, for example, that the misdemeanor
provision of the new registration law could be used to deny a Negro the ballot
for participation in a sit-in demonstration."1
The registrar's strategic position was also revealed by the publication of a
manual of procedures for registrars called, "Voter Qualification Laws in Loui-
siana: The Key to Victory in the Segregation Struggle." 1 9 Though published
by the Citizens' Councils the manual was used and its distribution supported by
state officials.22° In fact, in each of Louisiana's eight congressional districts,
joint meetings were held between the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee
and the State Board of Registration "for the purpose of formulating plans to
bring about a uniform enforcement of the voter qualification laws of the State
of Louisiana." '221 The minutes of these meetings clearly indicated an attempt
not only to resist campaigns for increased voter registration, but also to purge
Negroes from current voter registration rolls. 2 At one meeting Louisiana's
Attorney General, Jack P. F. Gremillion, emphasized that "the offices of the
registrars of voters of the parishes are extremely important adjuncts to our
battle for maintaining a segregated society in the state, and pledged the fullest
cooperation of his office to their efforts to operate their offices within the
strictest terms of Louisiana laws."22  This of course meant that as applied
to Negroes all the technicalities of the voter registration laws would be scrupu-
lously enforced.
The Civil Rights Commission found that thousands of Negroes were in
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ignorant electorate. Whoever encourages such a practice is not only a poor
citizen, he is dangerous and an enemy to you and your family. You as a
citizen must be vigilant against this danger which threatens every community
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fact disfranchised through the discriminatory application of these provisions.
Registrars discriminatorily barred Negroes from the franchise by (1) absent-
ing themselves from duty or failing to keep their offices open for business, (2)
slowing down the registration process by forcing large numbers 'of Negroes to
wait in line interminably as they sought to register or answer challenges to their
registration status, (3) requiring Negroes to produce registered votes to vouch
for their identification, (4) rejecting applications for registration because of
minor errors like spelling mistakes, (5) failing to notify Negroes that they have
not qualified to vote after filing applications for registration, and (6) submit-
ting Negroes to difficult constitutional interpretation tests not required of white
voters. "2 " In addition the Louisiana State Advisory Committee reported that
threats of bodily harm and economic reprisal "are possibly more common than
usually supposed."22
These discriminatory practices are a matter of public record. Yet it is hard
to make an accurate estimate of the total number of Negroes disfranchised be-
cause of them. Nevertheless, the following figures are instructive. In its 1961
report the Louisiana State Advisory Committee noted that since 1958, follow-
ing the purging tactics of white citizens' councils, Negro registration in the State
decreased by 30,000.2 In St. Landry Parish registration dropped from 13,060
to 7,281; and in Webster Parish, from 1,776 to 83227 Between December 31,
1960 and March 29, 1961 the number of registered Negro voters in St. Helena
Parish dropped from 1,243 to 14 and in Pointe Coupee Parish from 2,035 to
5.22" Finally, a federal district court, in a case challenging the constitutionality
of Louisiana's constitutional interpretation test, took notice of the fact that in
twenty-one parishes where the interpretation test was used only 8.6 per cent
of adult Negroes were registered as against 66.1 per cent of the adult white
population. Also, Negro registration in these parishes dropped from 25,361
to 10,351 after the interpretation test was put into use while white registration
was hardly affected.229
Literacy Tests
The literacy test is perhaps the most effective method of disfranchising the
Negro today. The Attorney General has testified that "our experience shows
overwhelmingly that the principal causes and method of discrimination has
been the abuse of so-called literacy or interpretation tests and similar per-
formance tests.""23 Since this is a complex field touching federal-state relations
at a most sensitive point let us briefly review the constitutional status of the
literacy test and the nature of the current problem. It should be recalled that
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mISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 50 STATES REPORT, 216-21 (1961). For a detailed record of these
practices see also testimony and exhibits in Voting Hearings op. cit supra note 219. Recently
Louisiana's Senator Allen J. Ellender made the startling admission that many of these practices
are prevalent in parishes where Negroes outnumber whites. N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1964, p. 1,
col. 4.
225 U.S. CoMMx. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 50 STATES REPORT, 220 (1961).
226 Id. at 211.
227 Ibid.
228 Id. at 219.
229 United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 381 (E.D. La. 1963).
230 Hearings on Literacy Tests and Voter Requirements, op. cit. supra note 197 at 262.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
the Supreme Court long ago held that "the privilege to vote in a State is within
the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and
upon such terms as to it may seem proper."231 The prior right of the state to
establish voter qualifications includes, of course, the right to apply a literacy
test.232 But that power is limited by the fourteenth 3 and the fifteenth 34
amendments. Thus, the infamous "grandfather clause" of the Louisiana Con-
stitution was struck down because it had the effect of disfranchising illiterate
Negroes, but not illiterate whites. 35
Today nineteen states administer some form of literacy test as a prerequi-
site for voting. In five of these states the test is quite simple in that the elector
must merely demonstrate that he can read a provision of the state or federal
constitution and write his name,23 while several other states require the elector
to read and write a section of the state or federal constitution."' New York
and Oregon require the elector to read and write in English.23 Wyoming and
Connecticut require him to read in English a section of the state constitution,3 9
while in the State of Washington he is required to read and speak English." 0
In Virginia, the elector must file an application for registration "in his own hand-
writing, without aid, suggestions, or memorandum." 241
More troublesome are the literacy tests of Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi.
In Georgia, the elector is required to read "intelligibly" and write "legibly" a
section of the state or federal constitution which a board of registrars submits to
him. If the applicant is unable to read or write because of a physical disability
the section is read to him, whereupon he must give a "reasonable interpretation"
of the provision. 42 If, however, the elector does not take the literacy test, he has
the option of qualifying to vote by meeting a good character test and showing
that he understands the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican
form of government, in which case he must answer correctly at least twenty or
thirty questions listed in the statutes243 and orally propounded to him by the
registrar.2" Louisiana requires an elector to be able to read and write in English
or in his native language, to be of good character, and to understand, as in
Georgia, the obligations of citizenship.245 Mississippi requires a similar citizen-
ship test and good moral character, but the elector must also be able to read and
write any section of the state constitution and give a "reasonable interpretation"
thereof.2 4
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Objective literacy tests, like the one required by North Carolina, seem be-
yond constitutional doubt. Not long ago a citizen of North Carolina, a Negro,
refused to take that state's literacy test on the ground that it contravened the
fifteenth amendment. In sustaining the test the Supreme Court said:
We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires
to adopt may be required of voters. But there is wide scope for
exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence requirements, age, previous
criminal record are obvious examples indicating factors which a
State may take into consideration in determining the qualifica-
tions of voters. The ability to read and write likewise has some
relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the
ballot. Literacy and illiteracy are neutral on race, creed, color, and
sex, as reports around the world show. Literacy and intelligence
are obviously not synonymous. Illiterate people may be intelligent
voters. Yet in our society where newspapers, periodicals, books and
other printed matter canvass and debate campaign issues, a State
might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise the
franchise. It was said last century in Massachusetts that a literacy
test was designed to insure an "independent and intelligent" exer-
cise of the right of suffrage. North Carolina agrees. We do not
sit in judgment on the wisdom of that policy. We cannot say, how-
ever, that it is not an allowable one measured by constitutional
standards.2 4 7 (citations omitted)
New York's literacy requirement that a citizen be literate in English was also
recently, questioned. A Puerto Rican citizen claimed that his denial of the
right to vote, despite his obvious literacy in the Spanish language, violated the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Both claims were rejected by the New
York Court of Appeals. 2 8- And later, a three-judge federal district court held
that the New York law- contravened neither the federal constitution nov the
Civil Rights Act of 1957 and 1960,-saying:
The statute is not an unreasonable exercise of the powers of
the state to provide requiremehts for 'exercising the elective fran-
chise. It is not unreasonable to expect a voter not only to be
conversant with the issues presented for determination in choosing
between candidates for elections, but also to understand the Ian-
guage used in connection with, voting. For example, there are
printed in English on the ballot synopses of proposed constitutional
amendments, titles of the offices to be filled' and directives as to the
use of the proper ballot or voting machines. Finally what is more
proper than that the' voter be literate in the language used to con-
duct the business of government in his state.
24 9
'
Of course, a literacy requirement which is prima fade fair and reasonable
might be unconstitutional Jn'moperation if administered discrimlnatorily. 250 In-
deed, the literacy tests of Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,- and South Carolina
247 Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51-53 (1959). Two
years later the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that "a test of literacy that requires an
applicant for registration to write a section or sections of the Constitution from the reading, and
dictation of another, however fairly and clearly .the same might be read, and dictated, is un-
reasonable and beyond the clear intent of the statute." Bazemore v. Bertie County Board of
Electors, 254 N.C. 398, 119 S.E. 2d 637, 642 (1961). : .
248 Camaeho v. Doe, 194 N.Y.S.2d 33- (1959).
249 Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155, 159 (S.D. N.Y. 1961).
250 Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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were designed to bar Negroes from the polls,251 and the constitutional status of
these laws is therefore in jeopardy. It should be noted, however, that the liter-
acy test was not extensively employed in the southern states prior to the 1950's
when Negroes were effectively excluded from participation in primary elections.
It is only since Smith v. Allwright2= that the literacy test has been applied to
disfranchise the Negro.2"'
Shortly after the white primary was nullified, Alabama ratified the so-
called Boswell Amendment which granted the franchise only to persons who
could "understand and explain any article of the constitution of the United
States in the English language." The court looked behind the legislation to take
judicial notice of the fact that the amendment was designed to circumvent the
Allwright case and to restrict Negro registration. In Davis v. Schnell254 the
amendment was struck down as unconstitutional on its face.
Schnell seemed at variance with an earlier case which held Louisiana's
"reasonable interpretation test" consistent with federal constitutional stand-
ards.255 But in Darby v. Daniel,5 ' decided in 1955, the "reasonable interpreta-
tion" test of Mississippi was upheld by a three-judge federal court against
federal constitutional objections. Darby was apparently distinguished from
Schnell since Mississippi provided a structure of administrative review in the
event of a denial of the right to vote, whereas Alabama delegated complete and
arbitrary power to the registrar to determine for himself whether a person has
met the test. Moreover, the court in Darby found no proof of the law's dis-
criminatory application and also declined, unlike the court in Schnell, to
inquire into legislative motives behind the statute.
Just recently, however, the "reasonable interpretation" test was again
reviewed by a three-judge federal district court in an important suit brought
by the United States under 42 U.S.C. 1971 against Louisiana; the test was
challenged as violative of the Civil Rights Act and the Constitution. Not only
did the court find overwhelming evidence of discrimination against Negroes by
registrars, but also found such to be "a matter of state policy in a pattern based
on the regular, consistent, predictable unequal application of the test."25
This, said the court, was "the inescapable effect of a subjective requirement
such as an understanding or interpretation test barren of standards and safe-
guards, the administration of which rests in the uncontrolled discretion of a
registrar." 28 Indeed, the "ineradicable vice vitiating any relation [of the test]
to a legitimate governmental objective is the raw power vested in registrar."2 9
In strong and unambiguous language the court struck down the interpretation
test as invalid per se under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments:
We hold: this wall, built to bar Negroes from access to the
franchise, must come down. The understanding clause or interpre-
251 KEY, op. cit. supra note 169 at 557-59.
252 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
253 KEY, op. cit. supra note 169 at 555.
254 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), af'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
255 Trudeau v. Barnes, 65 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 659 (1933).
256 168 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Miss. 1958).
257 United States v. State of Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 381 (E.D. La. 1963).
258 Ibid.
259 Id. at 386.
THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
tation test is not a literacy requirement. It has no rational relation
to measuring the ability of an elector to read and write. It is a
test of an elector's ability to interpret the Louisiana and United
States Constitutions. Considering this law in its historical setting
and considering too the actual operation and inescapable effect of
the law, it is evident that the test is a sophisticated scheme to dis-
franchise Negroes. The test is unconstitutional as written and as
administered.2 60
For practical reasons, however, the court did not order a new registration.
Tailoring the remedy to necessity and to a fair respect for established state pro-
cedures the court specifically enjoined the use of the state's citizenship test in
twenty-one parishes where the interpretation test resulted in the disfranchise-
ment of many Negroes, until such time that the state decides to order a general
re-registration so that all citizens might then register on an equal basis.26 The
court also enjoined the use of the citizenship test in the registration of any
person who was of voting age and had the required residence in his parish
before August 3, 1962.262 That was the date the objective citizenship test -
to be discussed below - was put into operation. 262 It should be noted that the
court did not decide whether the citizenship test was constitutional. In a
strong dissent Judge West noted that it was grossly improper for the court to
enjoin a valid state voter qualification law without setting it aside for constitu-
tional reasons.26 '
Freezing the Registration Rolls
Even the impartial administration of these tighter registration laws and
more difficult literacy tests will have the effect of minimizing Negro registration,
at least over the short run, if the southern states do not order new registrations.
Failure to do so probably constitutes discrimination since white voters already
registered would not be required to meet the demands of recently enacted voter
qualification laws now required of Negroes as well as whites. Thus, the registra-
tion rolls freeze the results of past discrimination. A federal district court de-
fined freezing as that which "results when there have been past discriminatory
practices, these practices are discontinued, but some action is taken which is
designed to retain the status quo, the position of advantage which one class
has already obtained over the other. '265  For instance, a Mississippi sheriff
responsible for collecting the poll tax instituted a new policy which required
individuals paying their poll tax for the first time to see him personally. On
review, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the discriminatory
purpose and effect of the new policy was obvious since it would affect almost
all Negroes, because of prior discrimination, but only a small percentage of
white people 66 This principle was accepted by another court in United States
v. Atkins, 67 but for practical reasons no re-registration was ordered.
260 Id. at 356.
261 Id. at 397.
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263 LA. REV. STAT. 18:191 (Supp. 1963).
264 United States v. State of Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 398 (E.D. La. 1963).
265 United States v. Dogan, 314 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1963).
266 United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 1963).
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The constitutionality of the freezing practice was also raised in United
States v. Louisiana.26 There, as we have said, the interpretation test was struck
down. Yet a majority of registered Louisiana voters never took the test since
it was not applied before 1954. Not only that, but thousands of Negroes were
denied registration between 1954 and 1963 when the interpretation test was
used discriminatorily. Then, anticipating an adverse ruling on the interpreta-
tion test the 1962 Louisiana legislature provided that the State Board of
Registrars draft an objective test of citizenship under a republican forn of
government. Prior to 1962 no objective test had been used. Though the new
test was considerably more difficult than the "tests" administered to white
applicants in the past and though it "will have the effect of perpetuating the
differences created by the discriminatory practices of the past, '269 the court
reserved judgment on the test's constitutionality, although enjoining its applica-
tion in twenty-one parishes, where the now unconstitutional interpretation test
was employed, until the state orders a new registration in those parishes.270
The Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to decide whether
the freezing practice violates constitutional standards and, if so, whether a state
must re-register every eligible voter in accordance with equal standards. The
issue was presented, but not decided, in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board
of Elections.. where the appellant pointed out that registered white voters who
qualified to vote without a literacy test under North Carolina's "grandfather
clause" prior to December 1, 1908 - after which the clause was not used -
rendered the literacy test administered to her violative of the fifteenth amend-
ment. Since this question was not decided by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in the case below, the Supreme Court did not reach it, but went on to
point out that Lassiter, in upholding North Carolina's literacy test, should not
be construed to bar the appellant from presenting the issue at some future
time in a proper proceeding.
V. THE CrvIL RIGHTS BrLL OF 1963-64
It was against the backdrop of these many socio-legal and political factors,
together with specific findings regarding the extent of racial discrimination in
elections, that led the Civil Rights Commission to conclude as follows in its
most recent report:
The conclusion is inevitable that present legal remedies for voter
discrimination are inadequate. In many instances, litigation has
not secured to qualified American citizens the right to vote. Fur-
ther, the narrowly drawn commands of voting decrees often are
evaded. In other instances, private intimidation - both before and
after registration - frustrates the ultimate exercise of the right. In
seven States, the right to vote - the abridgement of which is clearly
forbidden by the 15th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States - is still denied to many citizens solely because of their
race. 
27 2
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Disappointment with the results of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and 1960 moved
the Commission to recommend in an earlier report that Congress enact legis-
lation (I) to forbid the use of any literacy test, (2) to specifically prohibit
all discriminatory practices which interfere with the right to vote, and (3) to
make a sixth-grade education presumptive evidence of literacy if such a test is
administered.27 The most radical of these recommendations was the sugges-
tion to eliminate all literacy tests. But the proposals were even more restrictive
of state power since they provided that no state voter qualifications should be
imposed except those of age, residence, legal confinement, or conviction of a
felony." 4 Commissioners Robert G. Storey and Robert S. Rankin dissented
on the ground that the balance of the federal system would be upset if these
restrictions were imposed upon the states.27 "Proposals to alter longstanding
Federal-State relationships such as that incorporated in the Federal Constitu-
tion, declaring that the qualifications of electors shall be left to the several
States," said Storey, "should not be made unless there is no alternative method
to correct an existing evil." '276
But it is interesting to note that when the Commission submitted the recom-
mendation for a second time, in 1963, Commissioners Storey and Rankin con-
curred, and said:
Now, 2 more years have passed since the most recent of these
acts. The evil of arbitrary disfranchisement has not diminished
materially. The responsibility which must march hand-in-hand with
State rights no less than with civil rights has, as to the right to
vote, often been ignored. Progress toward achieving equal voting is
virtually at a standstill in many localities. For these reasons we
have concluded sadly, but with conviction, that without drastic
change in the means used to secure suffrage for many of our citi-
zens, disfranchisement will continue to be handed down from
father to son.2 77
The drastic changes referred to' were recommendations that Congress pro-
vide for the appointment of temporary voting registrars in areas where ten
or more individuals swear under oath that they have unsuccessfully attempted
to register, but believe they were denied the right to register because of race,
or color and that Congress, as a last resort, invoke the punitive section of the
fourteenth amendment by reducing the representation of states continuing to
deny the franchise to citizens because of their race. 78 As for voter qualifica-
tion laws, the Commission toned down its 1961 recommendation by indicating
that states might be allowed to' exclude citizens from'voting if- they have not
achieved a sixth-grade education or if they have been adjudged mentally in-
competent.2 7
9
The Congressional Response
It should be recalled here that on February 28, 1963, President Kennedy
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urged Congress to write additional guarantees into federal laws dealing with
the protection of the right to vote. 20 His proposals paralleled several recom-
mendations of the Civil Rights Commission. Three bills to forbid the discrim-
inatory application of literacy tests had been previously introduced into the
second session of the 87th Congress, 28' after which several days of hearings
were held,s 2 but no action on the bills was taken. Then, following weeks of
mass demonstrations against racial discrimination in the spring of 1963, the
President finally incorporated his February 28th proposals into an omnibus
civil rights bill which he submitted to Congress."s Personally convinced of the
moral necessity of such legislation and fearing that further congressional in-
action in the area of civil rights would retard "our Nation's economic and social
progress and weaken the respect with which the rest of the world regards us," 2 4
the President implored Congress to remain in session until its final passage.
Because of congressional politics and the untimely death of President Kennedy
the Civil Rights Act of 1963 never materialized. But President Johnson has
been no less insistent than his predecessor in pressing for the earliest possible
enactment of these civil rights proposals. 5
With the vigorous support of President Johnson the omnibus civil rights
bill, known as H.R. 7152,"6 was recently passed in the House of Representa-
tives by a substantial margin, 287 and as this is written is subject to a southern
filibuster in the U. S. Senate. In view of the fact that Title I, which deals with
voting rights and includes several presidential and commission recommenda-
tions discussed above, will probably survive the legislative skirmish intact, the
provisions of the voting title and some of the problems they raise will be briefly
considered.
Keyed to eliminating many of the discriminatory practices discussed in
this paper, Title I amends 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a) to require any person acting
under color of law to apply uniform standards, practices, or procedures in regis-
tering individuals to vote; and specifically forbids any such person (1) to deny
an elector his right to vote for errors or omissions on any registration applica-
tion "not material in determining whether such individual is qualified under
State law to vote," or (2) to employ any literacy test as a qualification for voting
unless the test is given in writing (except when the applicant requests and State
law authorizes an oral test) and a copy of the test and the answers thereto are
280 109 CONG. REc. 3081-82 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1963).
281 S. 480; S. 2750; S. 2979, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962).
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283 See H.R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,14-16 (1963).
284 Id. at 3.
285 In his first appearance before a joint session of Congress President Johnson emphasized
that:
[N]o memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President
Kennedy's memory than the earliest passage of the civil rights bill for which
he fought so long. We have talked long enough in this country about equal
rights. We have talked for 100 years or more. It is time now to write the
next chapter - and to write it in the books of law." He continued: "I urge
you again, as I did in 1957, and again in 1960, to enact a civil rights law so
that we can move forward to eliminate every trace of discrimination and op-
pression that is based upon race or color." 109 CONG. REC. 21734 (daily od.
Nov. 17, 1963).
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given to the applicant. Title I amends 42 U.S.C. 1971 (c) to create a rebuttable
presumption that a person who possesses a sixth-grade education is sufficiently
literate to vote in Federal elections. These provisions would apply only to
Federal elections. To avert the court delays which often frustrated the work
of the Civil Rights Division, the Attorney General was empowered to request
a three-judge federal district court to hear a voting case. Appeals from such
courts would, of course, lie directly to the Supreme Court. But if the Attorney
General does not file a request for a three-judge court the Chief Judge of the
district must designate a judge in the district to hear the case which would
have to be determined at the "earliest practicable date."" 8 Finally, Title VIII
requires the Census Bureau to collect registration statistics based on race, color,
and national origin relative to primary and general elections to the House of
Representatives since 1960 in areas designated by the Civil Rights Commission.
Beginning with the 1970 census those statistics would be collected on a nation-
wide basis." 9 It appears to have been the intention of the House to use this
provision as a basis for reducing, in accordance with Section 2 of the four-
teenth amendment, the representation of those states which continue to deny
citizens their right to vote 90 It is interesting to note that the temporary voting
registrar plan, supported by the Administration 9' and recommended by the
Civil Rights Commission,292 was not included in the final House version of
the bill.
Federal Power over Elections
However bold these voting rights provisions, still H.R. 7152 is far from
exhausting the plenitude of congressional power over elections. Whatever
doubts may exist about the power of Congress over state elections, that power
with respect to federal elections seems nearly complete if not unlimited. There
is no doubt, for example, that Art. 1, Sec. 4 grants Congress the authority to
provide for the appointment of voting registrars, independent of the courts and
the judicial process, to supervise state administration of federal elections. If
Congress wishes it might even establish separate federal election machinery
in the states to conduct the election of U.S. Senators and Representatives.
Indeed, it has been suggested that such a plan would not only minimize federal-
state conflict in this sensitive area, but also accelerate the process of achieving
universal Negro suffrage in America.29" The solution of H.R. 7152 is really a
conservative one, for Congress continues to rely on the courts and the police to
insure the right to vote instead of establishing needed administrative machinery
to undertake this task.
Perhaps the most drastic proposal to be advanced in getting at the problem
of discrimination in voting was the Civil Rights Commission's suggestion that
the punitive section of the fourteenth amendment be invoked, though only as
288 See H.R. REP. No. 914 supra note 286 at 1-2.
289 Id. at 15.
290 See 110 CONG. REc. 1824 (daily ed., Feb. 4, 1964) (remarks of Congressman Meader).
291 See testimony of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Hearings Before Subcommittee No.
5 of the House judiciary Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. No. 4, pt. II at 1379 (1963).
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a last resort. 294 This appears to be the veiled threat behind Title VIII of H.R.
7152 requiring the Census Bureau to collect voter registration statistics based
on race. Considering the many other options open to Congress this appears to
be a politically unwise and ineffective means of attacking the problem. The
Civil Rights Commission specifically recommended that this alternative not be
resorted to until after its registrar plan had at least been tried.295 It should, of
course, be pointed out that southern representation in Congress could not be
reduced until after the 1970 census. Perhaps Congress feels that the mere
threat of such a reduction in representation might induce southern states to
put their houses in order before that time. But there is no assurance of this.
At any rate, reducing Mississippi's congressional representation is not going to
get a single Mississippi Negro to the ballot box.
Another limiting feature of the bill is that it applies only to federal elec-
tions. Here again Congress failed to abide by the recommendations of the Civil
Rights Commission. So long as the electoral process in the states remains
indivisible H.R. 7152 will affect state as well as federal elections. But if a state
should decide to administer federal elections separate from its own elections the
latter would not be affected by the provisions of this bill. And it is not certain
that some states would not go through the expense and effort to accomplish
this. As Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier pointed out, "certain States of
the Union have shown a great willingness to incur considerable expense and
inconvenience, even to closing an entire public school system, to avoid granting
equality to their Negro citizens." 9 ' Certainly there is sufficient power in the
federal government to regulate state elections so as to eliminate discrimination
at the polls.
In this connection it should be pointed out that one of the constitutional
objections to these restrictions even as applied to federal elections is that they
conflict with the constitutional right of the 'state to set voter qualifications in
accordance with the seventeenth amendment and Section 2 of Article I. The
feature most objected to makes a sixth-grade education a rebuttable presump-
tion of literacy. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Election Commis-
sioners..7 is continually invoked by states' rights pleaders to support their posi-
tion. There, however, the Court merely upheld a state literacy requirement;
and in so doing the Court did not suggest that the power of a state to set such
a test was unlimited. Even a state's acknowledged right to set the boundaries
of its political subdivisions is limited by the fifteenth amendment. " s Indeed
Lassiter emphasized that "while the right of suffrage is established and guar-
anteed by the Constitution it is subject to the imposition of State standards which
are not discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that "Con-
gress acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed.129 (Emphasis
added.) In other words Lassiter does not bar positive congressional action
under the fifteenth amendment which reasonably seeks to eliminate the dis-
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crinination proscribed by the amendment. A large body of evidence testifies
to the fact that literacy tests have been used arbitrarily to deny Negroes their
right to vote. Federal prescription, therefore, 'of criteria and practices by which
literacy can be objectively determined, so as to foreclose'any possibility of
discrimination, seems eminently reasonable and appropriate. It would also
seem to be a reasonable presumption that a person with a sixth-grade education
is sufficiently literate at least for the purpose of voting.
Arbitrary denials of the right -to vote also violate the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the fourteenth amendment,"' provisions equally en-
forceable by appropriate legislatiofi. Erwin N. Griswold, Dean of the Harvard
Law School and member of the Civil Rights Commission, in a statement before
the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1962, even pointed to the relevancy of the
thirteenth amendment in support of federal limitations on the administration of
state voter qualifications, est~ecially literacy tests since, as he put it, "discrimina-
tion which exists on the-ground of race in a number of states with respect to
voting and other matters is a direct descendant of slavery as an institution in the
United States." Because Negro disfranchisement is a vestige of slavery, Griswold
holds, Congress might be justified in using this Amendment as additional sup-
port for doing away with such vestiges."'
Since this bill is designed to reach federal elections still other constitutional
provisions are applicable. In Twining v. New Jersey"'° the Supreme Court
indicated that the right to vote for federal officials is a privilege of national
citizenship secured by the fourteenth amendment. The privileges and immuni-
ties clause standing alone would therefore seem to constitute the necessary
support for remedial legislation against the arbitrary denial of the right to vote
in federal elections. Finally, Congress indisputably has the implied power to
protect the integrity of federal elections and accordingly 'may take whatever
necessary and proper steps it deems expedient to insure the purity of the federal
election ballot."3
Congressional power over federal elections might also be extended by
breathing meaning and life into "certain dormant constitutional provisions.
Take, for example, the Article I clause relating to the times, places, and man-
ner of holding elections. The term "manner" might well be interpreted to
include any aspect of the registration" process, including the iubstance and
application of literacy tests. There is no reason to bar a broad construction
of this provision. The fact that no Supreme Court decision currently supports
that construction is certainly no bar to congressional action under Article I,
Section 4.
A constitutional provision seldom discussed in connection with federal
power over state elections is Section 3 of Article IV, which declares, "The
United States shall guarantee to every State in t Union a Republican Form of
Government." ' 4 Once again, because congressional power under the Guarantee
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Clause has never been exercised is no reason why that provision should not be
applied to distinctive problems of representative government that confront the
states in the 1960's. No state government is truly republican which prevents
large blocs of qualified citizens from participating in the election of state repre-
sentatives. Of course, any state can easily argue that the interests of all its
citizens are considered by its government even though many of these citizens
are not permitted to vote and do not have representation proportionate to their
numbers. But this concept is kindred to the representation that benevolent dic-
tators are prone to give their subjects. One of the grievances of the colonists
before the American Revolution was that they were not actually represented
in Parliament; they were wholly unwilling to accept the Crown theory of virtual
representation. To them this was equivalent to no representation. Professor
William Crosskey of the University of Chicago Law School has suggested that
"since 'Republican Government' . . . is unsafe (if indeed it can be said to
exist) when the franchise is not enjoyed widely among the mass of qualified
men, Congress could also, very reasonably, pass laws to assure a broad enjoy-
ment of the right of voting ... throughout the forty-eight states."3 5
In failing to make the provisions of H.R. 7152 applicable to the states
Congress was apparently making a political judgment by perhaps not wishing
to exacerbate increasing federal-state tensions, especially in an election year.
By investing the Attorney General with power to request three-judge federal
district courts and by requiring all federal courts to expedite voting cases the
way may be cleared for more effective implementation of the right to vote.
Obviously legal sanctions are not the solution to the problem of nonvoting
among Negroes. Negro motivation and determination together with private
educational endeavor are also required. But law has a necessary and construc-
tive role to play. Indeed, when necessary law must come to the aid of those
illegally deprived of their constitutional rights. But Congress does not seem
ready to employ all, or even the most effective, weapons in its arsenal of con-
stitutional warfare. Yet given the quiescence of Congress on this issue for so
many decades, the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 are remarkable
achievements. They point out dramatically, as Commissioners Storey and
Rankin note in the 1963 Civil Rights Report, that "States rights carry with
them State obligations to all its citizens.""
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